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A number of eminent scholars have for a number of years carefully
argued that the national antidumping and subsidy rules are illogical.'
These criticisms generally take two forms.
The first position notes that dumping itself is not harmful to the
economy of the importing nation. This view relies predominantly on
consumer gains outweighing producer losses. This argument, however,
does not address the situation in the exporting country or the effect on
world Welfare as a whole. Similar arguments apply to subsidies.
2
The second position argues that the imposition of duties to deal
with dumping actually injures the importing nation by placing a tax
on imports (and' taxes on imports inevitably become taxes on ex-
ports).3 Some view this as simple protectionism, transferring wealth
from consumers in the importing country to the possibly inefficient
domestic industry of the importing country.
It is, of course, possible to argue both of the above positions, and
those who do are the fiercest critics of antidumping law. However,
some accept that antidumping rules are a necessary evil, on balance
• Baker & McKenzie, London. This piece is an extended version of a section from the
author's SJD thesis on the U.S.-Japanese Semiconductor Arrangement. The author wishes to
thank Professor John H. Jackson, Professor William Davey, Ilona Cheyne, and Martin Net-
tesheim, who all commented on a previous version of this article. The author remains responsi-
ble for all errors.
1. See, e.g., Friedman, In Defense of Dumping, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 20, 1978, at 73; In Defense
of Dumping, 81 THE COMMONWEALTH 360 (1987); Deardorff, Economic Perspectives on An-
tidumping Law, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (J. Jackson &
E. Vermulst eds. 1989); Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United
States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44 (1958); Barcelo, An-
tidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade. The United States and the International Antidumping Code,
57 CORNELL L. REv. 491, 559-60 (1972); Lowenfeld, Fair or Unfair Trade: Does It Matter?, 13
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 205 (1980); Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1989); Davey, "Antidumping Laws: A Time for Restriction" NORTH
AMERICAN MARKET ANTITRUST AND TRADE LAWS, ch. 8 (B. Hawk 1989).
2. See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 1.
3. See Stegemann, The Consideration of Consumer Interests in the Implementation of Anti-
Dumping Policy, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE CONSUMER 238-60 (OECD 1984) (Re-
port on the 1984 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Symposium); Stege-
mann, Anti-Dumping Policy and the Consumer, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 446 (1985).
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being better than any practical alternative;4 others argue for their
abolition.5
It should also be noted that various authors attack the national
implementation of the international principles on the basis that they
are protectionist. 6 These authors often do not question the basis of the
international rules, but merely the implementation at the national
level.
The purpose of this paper is to present arguments that may provide
support for the continuation of the international antidumping regime,
and in certain measure, for the continuation of national antidumping
rules. It steers an often difficult course between advocating tighter
controls on the use of antidumping actions as protectionist measures,
and their use to prevent potentially harmful dumping. However, this
paper does not attempt to define how to produce a rational antidump-
ing-type system, but merely provides some standards for assessing
whether that system is sensible.
This paper will attempt to analyze two distinct issues. First, it will
assert that the GATT principles on antidumping are in a state of ten-
sion, serving two opposing purposes. The first purpose is to liberalize
trade movements, in some measure attempting to rid the world of
harmful distortions. Such a function would concentrate primarily on
the private act of price discrimination. This purpose is, however, con-
tentious. The second and more familiar purpose of the GATT princi-
ples is to provide procedural and substantive safeguards against the
abuse of national antidumping rules. This purpose looks to the public
act of protectionism through the use of antidumping actions. This is
clearly a concern of the GATT antidumping regime and provided
most of the impetus towards the creation of the, two Antidumping
Codes. While I eventually conclude, that the controi of national an-
tidumping regimes is currently the most important aspect of the inter-
national principles (and has been since the 1960s), I believe that it is
4. Vermulst, for example, states:
Economists and lawyers increasingly argue that the antidumping laws should be revised to
bring them more into accordance with principles of economic and antitrust theory. This
criticism, however, assumes that antidumping laws should be e conomically fair. Although
this assumption is valid from a "welfare economics" point of view, it tends to forget that the
current antidumping laws might be the least of possible evils from a political point of view.
Vermulst, Injury Determinations in Antidumping Investigations in the United States and the Euro-
pean Community, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 301, 304 (1986) (footnote omitted).
5. See e.g., Barcelo, The Antidumping Law.- Revise It or Repeal It, I MICH. Y.B. INT'L
LEGAL STUDIEs 53 (1979); Caine, A Case For, Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the Tariff
Act of 1930, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 681 (1981); Knoll, United States Antidumping Law.
The Case for Reconsideration, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 265 (1987)."
6. See, e.g., Hindley, Dumping and the Far East Trade of the European Community, I I
WORLD ECON. 445 (1988).
Fall 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
important to re-state and examine the liberalizing function, even if
such function has been in large part discredited.
The second purpose of this paper is to attempt to see whether there
are any reasons for the continuation of the national antidumping laws.
The link between the two issues is that without some liberalizing
purpose of the international rules, individual nations would- have a
great temptation to forego antidumping regimes, thereby possibly
sending a message to foreign producers that certain behavior is
acceptable.
The current operative excesses of national regimes are cause for
concern. For example, the antidumping rules of the European Eco-
nomic Community ("EC")7 are under pressure because of the percep-
tion that they are being used in a protectionist manner. Such behavior
is made all the more troublesome by the inability of exporters to gain
meaningful judicial review of dumping measures. 8 Clearly all is not
well. But do these problems urge the abolition of antidumping rules?
This paper argues that it is essentially "undemocratic" to allow
low- to mid-level administrators in national executives to make "trade
policy," making decisions that affect potentially billions of dollars of
trade.9 While any system of administration is dependent upon the dis-
cretion of officials, national legislatures clearly do not intend that such
discretion be used as a means to manage large areas of trading rela-
tions between nations. While national officials should be able to decide
whether a particular expense is to be deducted or not, there is a quali-
tative difference between allowing this and allowing the instigation of a
7. See, e.g., Montagnon & Buchan, Stretching the GATT to its Limits, Fin. Times, Aug. 3,
1988, at 12, col. 1; The Abuse of Anti-Dumping, Fin. Times, Sept. 5, 1988, at 20, col. I; de
Jonquiires, Consumers Need a Voice, Fin. Times, Sept. 8, 1988, at 25, col. 6; Cassidy, Danger.-
Protectionist Influences at Work, Fin. Times, Sept. 8, 1988, at 25, col. I (letter); from Hindley,
The High Cost of EC Dumping Policy, Fin. Times, Nov. 25, 1988, at 13, col. I (letter); The Anti-
dumping Dodge, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 1988, at 77; de Clercq, Fair Practice, Not Protectionism,
Fin. Times, Nov. 21, 1988, at 29, col. 1.
8. See NTN Tokyo Bearing Co. v. European Community Council, 55 COMM. MKT. L.R. 76
(1989) (the Minibearings cases); see also Lockett, EEC Antidumping Law and Trade Policy After
Ballbearing II." Discretionary Decisions Masquerading as Legal Process?, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 365 (1987); see also Sharp Corp. v. European Community Council, 54 COMM. MKT. L.R.
381 (1989); Canon, Inc. v. European Community Council, 54 COMM. MKT. L.R. 91"5 (1989);
Tokyo Elec. Co. v. European Community Council, 54 COMM. MKT. L.R. 169 (1989); Silver Seiko
Ltd. v. European Community Council, 54 COMM. MKT. L.R. 249 (1989) (the Typewriter cases).
9. While only of tangential relevance, such an argument can be used to reject the currently
fashionable principle of "managed trade." See, e.g., Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and
Negotiations, Analysis of the U.S-Japan Trade Problem (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1989); Kis-
singer & Vance, Bipartisan Objectives for American Foreign Policy, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 899, 913
(1988); H. SHuTr, THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE 159-85 (1985); R. WALDMANN, MANAGED
TRADE (1986); C. PRESTOWITZ, TRADING PLACES 322 (1988); Note, Managing Dumping In a
Global Economy, 21 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 503 (1988). Clear adherence to principles
is a far more administratively efficient manner of proceeding than treating each and every prob-
lem on an ad hoc basis.
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trigger price mechanism for steel or a company and product specific
cost-based standard for imports of semiconductors. Of course, gaps in
the principles need to be filled, and interpretations of principles will
always need to be made. This type of discretion can be contrasted with
unfettered discretion to engage in negotiations to settle problems,
whatever the cost. If nations are to protect their national interests
from "unfair" trade, such a decision should be taken in the "full
glare" of public debate and should be based upon a full examination of
the costs involved in protection.' 0 Therefore, a major conclusion of
this paper is that national antidumping actions need to examine the
effect of imports on competition, and not only on competitors. Such an
obligation could be undertaken either unilaterally by nations or as a
result of international agreement.
The antidumping regime exists at two distinct levels: national and
international. The reasons for the enactment of the national rules are
not the same as the reasons for the establishment of the international
principles. Those who argue that the national rules as instruments of
national trade policy are outdated and ought to be abolished should be
made to address the question of whether the international principles
have also lost their validity. "1 If nations decide not to apply antidump-
ing rules because of domestic objections, such a unilateral decision
does not necessarily call into question the role of the international
principles.12
II. THE FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ANTIDUMPING PRINCIPLES
In this section, I will attempt to distinguish between the GATT
principles relating to antidumping and the national antidumping rules,
which represent the partial concretization of those principles. The two
groups are not, however, coterminous; not all facets of the principles
10. For a cogent explanation of this principle, see 0. LONG, PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF PROTEC-
TION (1987). In defending this thesis, Hugh Corbet has noted:
[B]ureaucrats in industrialised countries being left by ministers to play God for too long in
the field of international trade and competition; handing out a little bit of regulation here,
doing a little bit of negotiation there, cartelising one industry after another, until they have
helped not only to screw up the GATT system but also, and more importantly, to screw up
the economies in whose interests they might actually have believed they were working.
Corbet, Bureaucracies Left by Ministers to Play God for Too Long, Fin. Times, Jan. 29, 1988, at
23, col. I (letter).
11. One aspect of the existence of the international rules controlling national excesses (see
infra sec. II.C), is premised on the existence of national rules. If the national rules were removed,
the rationale for the international principles would to a large extent also be removed.
12. However, a decision on behalf of the U.S. or the EC to stop using antidumping rules
would, of course, have some effect on the continued effectiveness of the international rules.
Fall 1989)
Michigan Journal of International Law
are found in national rules, nor do all the rules reflect underlying inter-
national principles.
The international antidumping system was not set up until 1947.
Up to that date, only national rules addressed antidumping issues. Af-
ter the war, however, the Allied powers wanted to create an interna-
tional economic regime, and the U.S. put forward a proposal on an
antidumping regime modeled after its own national law.
At this point, it is appropriate to look at the national antidumping
rules for two reasons. First, given the paucity of material at the inter-
national level, it is important to understand how national actors
viewed the function of their antidumping rules. Given the historical
context of the formation of GATT, special emphasis will have to be
given to the United States rules. Second, the motivations towards the
national antidumping rules and the motivations involved in the forma-
tion of the international principles are manifoldly different. The con-
cerns shown at the national level are not totally reflected in the
international concerns. This divergence illustrates the general thesis of
this paper that the international principles and national rules do not
address the same issues, and that arguments for the removal of na-
tional rules do not necessarily impinge on the validity of the interna-
tional principles.
A. A Short History of the Function of National Antidumping Rules
In 1904, Canada passed the first law relating to what we would
today call dumping.' 3 The statute provided no indication as to the
purpose of the antidumping provision. However, it did refer to a devia-
tion from "fair market price."' 4 This reference might suggest that the
statute was not simply protectionist. Partial accounts of this an-
tidumping law indicate that it was passed to protect the infant Cana-
dian steel industry from short-term predatory dumping from the
13. The first antidumping law passed in Canada in 1904 predates any economic understand-
ing of the gains and losses from dumping. Arguably, the legal restriction has never had an eco-
nomic foundation, which suggests that the rationale for antidumping law may have to be found
outside any economic argument. To suggest that the antidumping law is economically unsound
is, of course, an important policy consideration and not one lightly ignored. However, such con-
sideration does not on its own justify the repeal of the law. Many statutes are economically
inappropriate, but their rationale lies elsewhere.
14. Section 19 of the Customs Tariff Act of 1904 states:
Whenever it appears to the satisfaction of the Minister of Customs, or of any officer of
customs authorized to collect customs duties, that the export price or the actual selling price
to the importer in Canada of any imported dutiable article, of a class or kind made or
produced in Canada, is less than the fair market value thereof . . . such article shall, in
addition to the duty otherwise established, be subject to a special duty of customs equal to
the difference between such fair market value and such selling price ....
Can. Stat. 4 Edw. VII, ch. 11, Sec. 19. This additional duty, however, was not to exceed one half
of the ordinary duty.
[Vol. 11:224
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cartelized U.S. steel companies.' 5 Edward Porritt quotes a Mr. Field-
ing in the Canadian House of Commons:
These trusts and combines ... are not worrying about the good of the
people of Canada. They send the goods here with the hope and expecta-
tion that they will crush the native Canadian industries. And with the
Canadian industry crushed out what would happen? The end of cheap-
ness would come, and the beginning of dearness would be at hand.
Ninety per cent of the complaints made to us by our manufacturers are
not that the tariff is too low, but that this dumping and slaughtering
exists. The dumping condition.., is not a permanent condition. It is a
temporary condition; and therefore it needs only a temporary remedy
that can be applied whenever the necessity for it arises.
16
Part of the problem of discriminatory pricing can be found in the high
tariffs prevalent at the turn of the century. Exporters would dump in
the export market partly to surmount import tariffs. The avoidance of
tariffs by dumping, however, seems not to have been an issue in the
enactment of the Canadian law.
The rules of antidumping law in the U.S. have a complex history.
The first provision to deal with international price manipulation was
section 73 of the Tariff Act of 1894.. This section made unlawful:
every combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement, or contract ... when
the same is made by or between two or more persons or corporations
either of whom is engaged in importing any article from any foreign
country into the United States, and when such combination, conspiracy,
trust, agreement, or contract is intended to operate in restraint of lawful
trade, or free competition in lawful trade or commerce, or to increase the
market price in any part of the United States of any article or articles
imported or intended to be imported into the United States, or of any
manufacture into which such imported article enters or is intended to
enter. 17
The Underwood Tariff Act of 1913, however, constituted the first
serious attempt to enact an antidumping-type statute in the United
States.18 This provision was deleted by the Senate Finance Committee.
Notwithstanding this setback, President Wilson, although opposed
to tariff increases, wanted to alleviate protectionist pressures against
15. It would seem from Porritt that the existence of free trade conditions in Great Britain
effectively precluded British firms from dumping in the Canadian market. E. PORRITr, SIXTY
YEARS OF PROTECTION IN CANADA 1846-1907, at 408 (1908).
16. Id. at 407.
17. Wilson Tariff Act, ch. 349, § 73, 28 Stat. 509, 570 (1894) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 8 (1982)). However, section 1 of the 1890 Sherman Act declared every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations to be illegal. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26
Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
18. See, e.g., Tariff Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 62d Cong., 3d.
Sess. (1913).
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predatory dumping. This concern led to the enactment of sections 800-
01 of the Revenue Act of 1916.t9 The Act criminalized international
price discrimination with the intent to injure, destroy, or prevent the
establishment of an industry in the United States. 20 This statute has
been little used because of the high threshold of intent required.
The push towards administrative control of dumping began in 1919
and partly grew out of dissatisfaction with the way the 1916 Act had
been utilized. 21 After some complicated Congressional actions22 and
the return of the protectionist Republicans to control of Congress and
the Executive in 1920, the provision eventually became part of the
Emergency Tariff Act of 192 1.23 Section 201 of the Emergency Tariff
Act of 1921 states:
That whenever the Secretary of the Treasury, after such investigation as
he deems necessary, finds that an industry in the United States is being
or likely to be injured, or is prevented from being established, by reason
of the importation into the United States of a class or kind of foreign
merchandise, and that merchandise of such class or kind is being sold at
less than its fair value, then he shall make such finding public to the
extent that he deems necessary....
Section 202 imposed "a special dumping duty in an amount equal
to such difference" if the purchase price or exporter's sales price was
less than the foreign market value. Although this wording has been
expanded and refined on numerous occasions, its thrust remains essen-
tially the same.
It is difficult to glean a consistent rationale for the enactment of an
administrative antidumping law in the U.S. context. It would not be
unreasonable to suggest that many Congressmen voted for a provision
whose implications they did not fully understand. Some Congressmen
seemed to be confused about what was intended by the various bills'
provisions; some confused dumping with simple fraudulent undervalu-
ation of import prices,24 while others stated that it dealt with sales
19. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 800-01, 39 Stat. 756, 798 (1916) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 71-72 (1982)).
20. It has been strongly suggested that the 1916 Act was enacted to extend the provisions
against unfair competition found in the Clayton Act to import trade. See Letter from Assistant
Attorney General Samuel J. Graham to the New York Times, July 4, 1916, at 10, col. 6, where
he said, "Just as we have said to our own people by the Clayton Act that they should not indulge
in unfair competition, so we propose to say the same to the foreigner."
21. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 479, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1920); U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION,
DUMPING AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (1919), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 479, 66th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-3 (1920).
22. J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 258-60 (1966).
23. The Emergency Tariff Act of 1921, ch. 14, §§ 201-12, 42 Stat. 9, 11-15 (1921).
24. See, e.g., Tariff Hearings Before House Ways and Means Comm., 62d Cong., 3d Sess.
6149-50 (1913); see also 50 CONG. REC. 1365 (1913) (statement of Rep. Peters).
[Vol. 11:224
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below the cost of production. 25
Congressmen believed that the practice of dumping had assumed
massive proportions. The 1921 bill introducing the administrative an-
tidumping action was motivated by the perception that massive dump-
ing was occurring due to the return to the U.S. of goods stockpiled in
Europe during World War 1.26 When witnesses were examined by the
Senate Finance Committee, however, they produced no evidence of
any current dumping. This finding produced much controversy in the
congressional debates, since the bill was seemingly enacted to handle a
problem which had not yet, and might never, arise.
27
While the circumstances surrounding the actual existence of
dumping are clear, the reasons for passing the Act are not. In some
instances, the rationale of the legislation appears to be merely that of
raising revenue. 28 In other cases, the rationale appears to have been
avoidance or prevention of predation. 29 The antidumping provision,
25. Senator McCumber's idea of what the 1921 bill aimed for seemed to diverge from the
wording of the provisions. He stated, "[U]sing the term 'dumping' as we understand it- that is,
as referring to products sold in this country for a less price than the producing cost in the coun-
try of production." 61 CONG. REC. 1099 (1921).
26. See 61 CONG. REC. 1099 (1921).
27. See, e.g., 61 CONG. REC. 1021 (1921) (exchange between Sens. McCumber and King); 61
CONG. REC. 1098-1100 (1921); 61 CONG. REC. 1103-04 (1921) (statement of Sen. Simmons).
Such an issue led one Senator to conclude, "My understanding is that the Ways and Means
Committee incorporated the antidumping clause, not because of dumping that was going on at
the time of the passage of this act through the House... [but m]erely as an insurance policy, a
guaranty against future dumping, something that might happen." 61 CONG. REC. 1100 (1921)
(statement of Sen. Watson).
28. According to Rep. Lenroot, the stated purpose of the bill containing the 1913 antidump-
ing clause was "only" the purpose of raising revenue and has "no element of protection." 50
CONG. REC. 1365 (1921); cf statement of Sen. Penrose on the 1921 provision: "Whether rates
are raised or not, the antidumping provision is not intended to produce much revenue." 61
CONG. REC. 1068 (1921).
29. For example, in the House debates on the 1921 bill, Mr. Fordney noted:
Several countries of the world in the presence of the experience now being undergone by this
country have enacted such legislation. It protects our industries and labor against a now
common species of commercial warfare of dumping goods on our market at less than cost or
home value, if necessary, until our markets are destroyed, whereupon the dumping ceases
and prices are .raised at above former levels to recoup dumping losses. By this process, while
temporarily cheaper prices are had, our industries are being destroyed, after which we more
than repay in higher prices.
61 CONG. REC. 262 (1921).
In the Senate, Senator McCumber reiterated this purpose when he said, "[Tihe purpose of the
bill is to prevent an attempt by any foreign producer to dump his goods into the United States for
less than cost for the purpose of destroying an industry in the United States." 61 CONG. REC.
1022 (1921). He continued:
[t]he purpose is to allow the manufacturers in the United States to continue in business, even
though it costs them much more to manufacture than it does those in a foreign country and
to provide for the employment of American labor and American capital, because anyone
who has followed the ups and downs of any business in the United States in which there is
competition knows that when an industry in the United States is destroyed by underselling
by a foreign competitor all prices immediately go up to an exorbitant degree and far beyond
what was originally the American price.
Id.
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Senator Penrose noted, "is a preventative. The mere fact that the pro-
vision exists on the statute books tends to prevent dumping."
'30
At other times the rationale seems to suggest straightforward pro-
tection of U.S. industry. It is possible that there was something other
than straightforward protectionism involved in enacting dumping
rules since, prior to the GATT, nations could do whatever they liked
in terms of commercial policy. If they wanted to protect their domes-
tic industry, they simply could have levied a tariff or imposed a quota.
At this time, however, Congress was in charge of setting tariff rates
and thus any alteration in duties would have demanded congressional
attention. Congress would have to have been involved in all cases al-
leging dumping or subsidization. This involvement would have been
slow, cumbersome and inefficient use of congressional time. As Con-
gress jealously guarded its rights to impose tariffs, in setting up an
administrative antidumping system, it made the imposition of addi-
tional duties for antidumping reliant upon certain conditions, which, if
found to be fulfilled, provided an almost automatic imposition of
duties.
While it is possible that the U.S. Congressmen did not understand
what they were doing, and therefore confused price discrimination
with the prevention of predation or sales below cost, it is also possible
that they understood that the problems of administering a system
based on cost were insurmountable. In order to determine whether
such sales were being made, an administering authority would not
only need great economic and accounting expertise, but also the coop-
eration of the alleged dumper, who may or may not have a presence
within the enforcing jurisdiction. It is also possible that the alleged
dumper, even if it had a presence in the U.S., would have been unwill-
ing to hand over confidential business data to foreign government offi-
cials. By way of contrast, the price of a good is so-called "hard data."
It is much easier to find list prices of a'good on two distinct markets
than to try to discover the actual cost of a product. This situation may
have led the Congressmen to favor a system which utilized "hard
data" and which was able to be administered by relatively unskilled
officials. This problem of administration has been a recurrent theme
throughout the history of antidumping law. 31
Congress was also aware of the possibility of "mirror" action. In
the rather uncertain postwar period, simply raising the tariff in order
30. 61 CONG. REC. 1068 (1921).
31. While not elevating a principle of "administrability" to a determinative factor, it seems




to protect might have invited retaliation. Nations thus began to em-
phasize the element of "unfairness," which shifted the emphasis away
from the conduct of the importing country to the conduct of the ex-
porting country. If an act was normatively unfair, then acting against
such practice would simply be restoring the status quo, and hence
clearly not protectionist.
Many of the motivations of the national legislatures, therefore,
were not relevant to the formulation of international principles. In-
deed, some motivations, such as simple protection of domestic indus-
tries, were antithetical to the aims of the international system.
Until 1947, the national rules were based on price discrimination
and most were particularly concerned with predation from cartels. In
1947, with the signing of the GATT, however, the principles underly-
ing the rules were becoming increasingly obscure.
B. A Short History of the Purpose of the GA TT
Antidumping System
The first U.S. suggestion for the international economic regime
was a State Department report entitled "Proposals for Expansion of
World Trade and Employment," published in November 1945.32 This
report paid little or no attention to the issue of dumping, only re-
marking that "Members should undertake: . . . 3. To subscribe to a
general definition of the circumstances under which antidumping and
countervailing duties may properly be applied to products imported
from other members."
33
The next step was another U.S. report, "Suggested Charter for an
International Trade Organization of the United Nations, ' 34 published
in September 1946. Article 11 of this Charter was related to antidump-
ing actions and apparently aimed to constrain such national meas-
ures. 35 However, it should not be overlooked that the U.S. proposals
32. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2411, PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE
AND EMPLOYMENT (1945).
33. Id. at 11-12.
34. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2598, SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1946).
35. Article 11 read inter alia:
I. No antidumping duty shall be imposed on any product of any Member country im-
ported into any other Member country in excess of an amount equal to the margin of
dumping under which such product is being imported. For the purposes of this Article,
the margin of dumping shall be understood to mean the amount by which the price of a
product exported from one country to another is less than (a) the comparable price
charged for the like or similar product to buyers in the domestic market of the exporting
country, or, (b) in the absence of such domestic price, the highest comparable price at
which the like or similar product is sold for export to any third country, or, (c) in the
absence of (a) or (b), the cost of production of the product in the country of origin; with
Fall 1989]
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also included a section on the control of restrictive business practices.
In explaining why the U.S. felt such practices needed to be con-
trolled,36 a senior official noted that cartels had been used to prevent
the development of new industries, often through deliberate dump-
ing.3 7 The comprehensive nature of the U.S. "system" suggests that
the U.S. realized that dumping could be detrimental to world welfare.
Had the U.S. only been concerned about its own welfare, it would have
only acted at its border, rather than propose an international regula-
tory system. The observation that dumping can prevent the develop-
ment of new industries also helps explain why the U.S. proposals
allowed the use of antidumping actions, rather than simply prohibiting
them. This observation is particularly relevant since the documents
cited above suggest that the main U.S. preoccupation with antidump-
ing law was its regulation and not its facilitation.
As eventually agreed upon by the Preparatory Committee,38 article
VI of the GATT contains the current formulation of the price discrim-
ination rule. Entitled "Antidumping and Countervailing Duties," it
stated:
The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products are
introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal
value of the products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens mate-
rial injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting
party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry.
The concept of normal value, or home market price, was defined as
follows: A product is sold below its normal value if the price of the
product when exported to another country is:
(a) less than the price on the home market for a similar product sold
under similar conditions;
(b) in the absence of such a home market price;
due allowance in each case for the differences in conditions and terms of sale, for differ-
ences in taxation, and for other differences affecting price comparability ...
5. Each Member undertakes that as a general rule it will not impose any antidumping duty
or countervailing duty on the importation of any product of other Member countries
unless it determines that the dumping or subsidization, as the case may be, under which
such product is imported, is such as to injure or threaten to injure a domestic industry,
or is such as to prevent the establishment of a domestic industry.
Id. at 5-6.
36. As to how this control was to be achieved, see infra text accompanying note 46.
37. Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on Trade and Employment (2d
mtg.), U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.III/PV/2, at 4 (1946) (statement of Mr. Wilcox).
38. As will be noted below in the text accompanying notes 69-71, the discussion of antidump-
ing rules in the Preparatory Committees does not unambiguously suggest that the contracting
parties agreed that the purpose of antidumping rules was to restrain national antidumping ac-
tions. At one end of the spectrum of debate, the U.K. delegation opposed inclusion of the possi-
bility of imposing antidumping duties; at the other end, other nations wished to make




(i) less than the price on a third market for a similar product sold
under similar conditions;
(ii) less than the cost of production in the country of origin plus a
reasonable amount for selling costs and profit.
A number of initial observations about the GATT system of an-
tidumping regulation need to be made. First, the GATT contains no
condemnation of dumping. 39 Some commentators mistakenly argue
that dumping is internationally condemned, or even "illegal." 4 Arti-
cle VI, however, only condemns injurious dumping. Even if dumping
causes injury, it is not prohibited, but merely "condemned." Dumping
can only be reacted against by nations if injury is proven and directly
caused by the dumping. The absence of any condemnation of dumping
per se means that nations are not obliged to prohibit 4 nor even dis-
courage dumping by their nationals. Even though the GATT contains
no condemnation of dumping, nor obligation of nations to act against
dumping on third markets by their nationals, it should be noted that,
in 1954, New Zealand proposed that article VI be amended to include
the phrase "[a]ccordingly contracting parties shall refrain from action
which would cause or encourage dumping of this kind."' 42 The propo-
sal was not accepted because the contracting parties felt that they
could not control the commercial activity of companies. 43 This con-
39. Several nations tried unsuccessfully to have such a condemnation included in the
wording.
40. Dumping, according to Malcolm Baldridge, "is anti-free trade and is illegal under U.S.
laws as well as under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In short, sanctions against
illegal dumping and for opening markets are pro-, not anti-free trade." Baldridge, There Won't
Be a Trade War, Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1987, at A27, col. 2; see also C. PRESTOWITZ, supra note
9, at 38, where he states, "The only problem was that dumping is illegal under both U.S. trade
law and under the international rules of GATT." See also The Unfair Foreign Competition Act of
1985: Hearings on S. 1655 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. 72
(1985) (statement of Sen. Howell Heflin that " '[d]umping' is clearly unlawful. ... ); cf J.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, 412 nn.9 & 10 and accompanying text
(1969).
41. Viner recognized the difficulty of requiring exporting nations to prohibit dumping by
their nationals. He noted in 1926:
There is little, if any, basis for faith in the feasibility of international control of the dumping
problem by means of agreement on the part of the particular countries to prevent dumping
by their exporters .... It is utopian to expect that many Governments could be persuaded
voluntarily to adopt a policy which would involve either [such] consequences for its export-
ing industries.
J. VINER, MEMORANDUM ON DUMPING para. 23 (1926). This issue was also raised in the GATT
Panel report on the Canadian FIRA legislation, where the panel pointed out, "[i]n particular, the
General Agreement does not impose on contracting parties the obligation to prevent enterprises
from dumping." GATT, Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act: Report of
the Panel Adopted on 7 Feb. 1984, L/5504, BISD, 30 Supp. 140, 164 (1984). Arguably the ability
of a contracting party to prohibit dumping might infringe upon article XI (to the extent it con-
trols exports) since such ability would be outside the scope of article VI.
42. GATT, Proposals by the New Zealand Government, U.N. Doc. L. 270/Add. 1, at 3
(1954).
43. GATT, Summary Record of the Forty-First Meeting, U.N. Doc. SR. 9/41, at 2 (1955).
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cern, however, was partially reflected in a report adopted in 1955,
which stated that "contracting parties should, within the framework
of their legislation, refrain from encouraging dumping, as defined in
that paragraph, by private enterprises." 44 The precise obligation con-
tained within this statement, however, remains unclear.
Second, and more significantly for our purposes, contracting par-
ties were not obliged to enforce any antidumping law.45 However, one
should be wary of concluding that the GATT did not intend to impose
obligations on contracting parties in terms of their internal relations
with private citizens. Even though the GATT principles are clearly
addressed only to the contracting parties, the aborted International
Trade Organization ("ITO") would have undertaken, albeit indirectly,
to regulate restrictive business practices of individuals. Chapter V of
the "Suggested Charter" would have obliged members to "take ap-
propriate individual and collective measures to prevent business prac-
tices among commercial enterprises which restrict competition,
restrict access to markets or foster monopolistic control in interna-
tional trade."'46 Under the original regulatory scheme, therefore, even
though nations would not have been obliged to take antidumping ac-
tions, they would have been obliged to deal with anticompetitive pri-
vate actions which, inter alia, might have fostered the ability to dump.
This latter obligation would have buttressed the governmental obliga-
tion to limit conditions that positively facilitated dumping by private
individuals or firms. The ITO was not approved, however, and the
GATT system therefore only regulates the practice of nations and does
not place any restrictions on non-governmental actors.
The broad public/private distinction currently characterizing
GATT obligations probably results in the impression that the GATT
antidumping principles were formulated only to control. national an-
tidumping laws. Certainly later in the life of the GATT, the control of
national antidumping laws became a major preoccupation, and the ac-
tions of certain contracting parties, particularly the U.S. and the EC,
were a primary cause of the negotiation of the two antidumping
Codes.
However, the New Zealand delegate noted that the proposal was intended not to make nations
act positively against their nationals but only to refrain from facilitating the possibility of
dumping.
44. GATT, BISD, 3 Supp. 223 (1955).
45. See GATT, infra note 77, at 83 (Panel noting, "Article VI does not oblige an importing
country to levy an anti-dumping duty whenever there is a case of dumping....").
46. SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 34,
art. 34, para. 1.
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C. The "antiprotectionist" function
Concerns over the possible protectionist use of national antidump-
ing laws have existed ever since the inception of the GATT. The U.S.
clearly held such concerns, as evidenced by its proposals for an inter-
national trade regime.
In 1961, a GATT Group of Experts noted:
The Group agreed that it was essential that countries should avoid im-
moderate use of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, since this
would reduce the value of efforts that had been made since the war to
remove barriers to trade. These duties were to be regarded as exceptional
and temporary measures to deal with specific cases of injurious dumping
or subsidization.4
7
The two Antidumping Codes were clearly negotiated in order to
limit the abuse of national antidumping laws. Although both Codes
had numerous concerns, their main purpose was to "standardize" the
GATT principles and to adopt uniform procedures and interpretations
of key concepts. This attempt at standardization was undertaken in
order to eliminate both divergences from the principles of article VI
and the existence of national differences which in application could
amount to restrictions on trade.
Both the 1967 and 1979 Codes state in their Preambles "that anti-
dumping practices should not constitute an unjustifiable impediment
to international trade .... ,,48 The main impetus 49 for the 1967 Code
was the general perception that the U.S. law operated in such a way as
to, "chill" international trade. 50 The U.S. had a cumbersome and com-
plex antidumping regime 5' which was regularly the object of criticism,
both domestically51 and internationally. 53 However, the U.S. was also
47. GATT, ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES: REPORT OF A GROUP OF Ex-
PERTS 5, U.N. Sales No. GATT/1861-2 (1961).
48. GATT, BISD, 15 Supp. 24 (1968); see also GATT, BISD, 26 Supp. 171 (1980).
49. The other major concern was that as tariff barriers were negotiated away, governments
would use non-tariff barriers as a way of offsetting the tariff concessions made under the Ken-
nedy Round formula. U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, PUB. No. 252, OPERATION OF THE TRADE
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 18TH REPORT 37 (1966).
50. According to commonly quoted statistics, the U.S. Treasury Department acted on 321
antidumping complaints between 1955 and 1964. See infra note 52. Of these cases, only nine
resulted in duties being imposed. Sixty-eight were terminated due to a voluntary increase in the
exporters' prices; no sales at less than fair value "LTFV" were found in 208; and in thirty six, the
Tariff Commission found no injury.
51. See J. EVANS, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: THE TWILIGHT
OF THE GATT? 106-10 (1971); T. CURTIS & J. VASTINE, JR., THE KENNEDY ROUND AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN TRADE 205-06 (1971); R. DALE, ANTIDUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL
TRADE ORDER 71-72 (1980).
52. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 12,075-77 (1965).
53. See, e.g., J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY LAW: THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 8-9 (1986).
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critical of foreign antidumping regimes, which it viewed as non-trans-
parent and discretionary. 54 At the beginning of the Kennedy Round, it
was agreed that some attention should be given to non-tariff barriers.
With this in mind, the major parties negotiated the Code, which sub-
stantially expanded upon Article VI and clarified the obligations of the
contracting parties. The negotiators hoped that the Code would elimi-
nate "unjustifiable" barriers to international trade arising out of the
administration of antidumping statutes.
The circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the 1979 Code
are similar, but much more complex. First, some inter-governmental
wrangling in the U.S. had clouded the issue whether the U.S. was fully
in accordance with its obligations under the 1967 Code. The President
had argued that the Code could be accepted without the express ap-
proval of the Congress. Congress disagreed and enacted legislation55
which obliged the implementing authorities to depart from the obliga-
tions under the Code in certain limited circumstances.56 While the
U.S. negotiators argued that the U.S. in fact applied the provisions of
the 1967 Code, other contracting parties disagreed and argued that the
"standardizing" function of the international Code was not being ap-
plied by the United States.
57
Second, after the OPEC-induced recession in the mid- to late-
1970s, the EC increasingly relied upon its antidumping measures as a
way of fending off competition.58 Unlike the U.S., however, the EC
realized that it was bound by the 1967 Code.
Third, a Subsidies Code was negotiated as part of the Tokyo
Round negotiations. Since the injury principles found in the new Sub-
sidies Code were very similar to those found in the 1967 Code, negoti-
ators believed that the provisions of any Antidumping Code should
substantially mirror those found in the Subsidies Code. 59 Such parallel
interpretations would also tend to limit "action-shopping."
Finally, in order to allay the fears of the developing countries that
their progress might be harmed by the antidumping actions of devel-
54. See U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, PUB. No. 252, OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROGRAM, 19TH REPORT 230-31 (1969).
55. See Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-634, § 201, 82 Stat. 1345
(1968).
56. See, e.g., J. JACKSON, J.V. Louis & M. MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO
ROUND 145-46 (1984); T. CURTIS & J. VASTINE, supra note 52, at 146; Pintos & Murphy, Con-
gress Dumps the International Code, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 180 (1968).
57. See J. JACKSON, J.V. LOUIS & M. MATSUSHITA, supra note 57, at 164-65; E. VERMULST,
infra note 65, at 544-45; BESELER & WILLIAMS, supra note 54, at 11-13.
58. See J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 54, at 13.
59. GATT, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 181, U.N.
Sales No. GATT/1979-3 (1979).
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oped countries, the negotiators felt that a new code should acknowl-
edge the special position of the developing countries. 6° To a certain
extent the new Code gave effect to all these concerns.
61
D. The "Liberalizing" Function
Despite the seemingly overwhelming evidence that the GATT
principles exist only to control the excesses of national antidumping
regimes, there is an alternative interpretation of the international prin-
ciples. If this interpretation (explained below) is indeed correct, then
it would appear that the GATT antidumping principles are more am-
biguous than commonly assumed, reining in the use of antidumping
legislation to preclude its use as a non-tariff barrier, but at the same
time looking to control the phenomenon of dumping.
Commentators such as Bhagwati62 and Petersmann 63 argue that
antidumping and countervailing duty rules are a necessary part of the
international trade order. 64 Both argue that a fundamental principle of
the GATT system was the protection of undistorted competition.
Bhagwati explains why this must be the case:
The trade regime that one constructs must ... rule out artificial compar-
ative advantage arising from interventions such as subsidies and protec-
tion. It must equally frown upon dumping, insofar as it is a technique
used to secure an otherwise untenable foothold in world markets. 65
The reason for the assumption that the international system may
differ from the national system may not be immediately apparent. The
concept of gains from free trade is usually explained in terms of a sin-
gle country. The theory of comparative advantage may be used to
show how if Country A unilaterally derestricts its trade and relies on
international specialization, it will gain more than in the situation
where it protects its domestic economy. However, can an international
60. GATT, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: SUPPLEMEN-
TARY REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF GATT 11, U.N. Sales No. GATT/1980-1
(1980); see also G. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND OF NEGOTIA-
TIONS 353-54 (1986).
61. For a brief description of the process of negotiation, see S. METZGER, THE AMENDED
ANTIDUMPING CODE AND THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979 (1982); J. QUINN & P.
SLAYTON, NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND 153-72 (1982); J. BESELER & A.
WILLIAMS, supra note 54, at 14.
62. J. BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 33-37 (1988).
63. Petersmann, Constitutional Functions of Public International Economic Law, in RE-
STRUCTURING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE ROLE OF LAW AND LAWYERS
49, 61-62, 66-67 (1987).
64. Others have noted the trade-liberalizing function of the GATT antidumping rules. See E.
VERMULST, ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 14 (1987), which states: "Paradoxically, antidumping laws serve an extremely
useful function in the maintenance of a liberal free trade system, as exemplified by GATT."
65. J. BHAGWATI, supra note 63, at 34.
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trading system be constructed out of the principle of unilateral der-
estriction? The nation engaging in unilateral free trade is attempting
to "maximize" its own welfare. When one tries to expand the princi-
ple of liberalization into an international order, however, one is driven
to suggest that there have to be principles by which the system is po-
liced in order to preserve its overall integrity; the system cannot oper-
ate if parts of the system do not adhere to the same principles. In
constructing an international system, the focus has shifted from na-
tional welfare to world welfare. The national, unilateral idea of free
trade ignores the actions of others; the international system cannot.
While a nation may ignore the acts of others because it gains (at the
expense, for example, of nations that subsidize their exports, or, in the
absence of predation, companies that sell below some notion of cost),
the international system increases world welfare by ensuring that all
actors pursue liberalized trading behavior because world welfare is the
total of all the national figures. If one is indeed trying to ensure the
efficient allocation of resources in an international context such as the
GATT system, one has to argue that liberalization and freedom from
distortion are required in all parts of the system. This colfresponds to
the original conception of the ITO, which constrained both public and
private barriers to international trade.
The argument that, under certain circumstances, the international
system needs to constrain dumping might lead to the conclusion that
the international system should enforce the principles in the form of
international rules. However, the GATT system technically does not
have the power to administer rules, since GATT is not an interna-
tional organization with autonomous powers but rather a body com-
prised of its contracting parties. It might be argued, however, that the
GATT does not need to enforce rules because it can rely on the inter-
ests of producers or nations to bring actions. 66 Arguments suggesting
that the national rules are illogical seek to undermine the use of the
national antidumping laws, and if successful might severely weaken
the international principles.
Even if individual nations reject the use of antidumping laws for
nationalistic reasons, Bhagwati and Petersmann might suggest that a
GATT-type system cannot afford to encourage rejection of national
rules, which it relies upon to avoid potentially harmful distortions.
Without national rules, the GATT principles become an empty letter.
If Bhagwati and Petersmann are correct, arguments as to abolition of
66. Some nations have a vested interest in the integrity of the system, but all see their own
national political interests at stake. However, evidence suggests that antidumping actions are
only pursued regularly by four jurisdictions: the U.S., the EC, Canada, and Australia.
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national antidumping rules per se would have to address the 'system-
preserving' function of the GATT principles. Although the national
antidumping actions are currently increasing both in number and in
amount of trade affected, only the "Big Four" jurisdictions- Austra-
lia, Canada, the EC, and the U.S.- frequently use their own rules. If
the "Big Four" unilaterally decided to repeal their antidumping laws
(an extremely unlikely scenario!) or not to enforce them, there would
be no means to prevent dumping. The behavior that the international
rules were intended to discourage might increase after all.
How might the use of national antidumping rules help preserve the
GATT system? Many lawyers, undoubtedly influenced by Chicago
School economic theory, question the rationality of national an-
tidumping policies on the basis of their effect on national welfare.
Why do nations use antidumping rules when they end up worse off
than if-they did nothing at all? A powerful nation such as the U.S., or
the EC, with a vested interest in the integrity of the system, might
argue that removing all national antidumping rules, given their deter-
rence function, would endanger the international allocation of re-
sources. 67  National antidumping rules may, in fact, act as a
deterrent.68 Even though the imposition of duties in particular cases
probably hurts the levying country just as much as the alleged
dumper, these duties might serve as a deterrent to other dumpers. 69
We should, however, draw attention to the possible abuse of the argu-
ment that a nation uses its antidumping law as a way of deterring
other nations' subjects from acting in an "irrational" manner. In par-
ticular, where such "selfless policing" of the international arena pro-
tects a domestic industry in the importing country, one might ask
whether deterrence of inefficient dumping is the real, or even primary,
motivation.
A more subtle explanation of why nations might act against dump-
67. In order to assess whether a nation gains from antidumping actions, one must take into
account the amount of dumping that is deterred. This calculus of deterrence is likely to be impos-
sible to quantify.
68. However, the current complexity and arbitrariness of the national antidumping rules lead
to the conclusion that firms do not know when they are dumping. If so, then it is unlikely that
the rules can deter. See, e.g., Hearings on S.1655, infra note 81, at 35-36 (statement of Gilbert
Kaplan):
A foreign producer may not even know whether he is dumping. He doesn't know offhand
what benchmark we are going to look at when we start a dumping case. He doesn't know
what effect currency fluctuations might have between the time he signs a contract and actu-
ally sells and the time the investigation starts. He doesn't know what such or similar mer-
chandise we are going to be basing our comparisons on. We often don't find precisely the
same merchandise in foreign markets, and we have to make adjustments based on different
kinds of merchandise. This is the sort of thing a foreign exporter cannot predict.
69. A similar reasoning applies to the imposition of countervailing duties to offset foreign
subsidies.
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ing, arguably to their own detriment, might be that they are trying to
persuade the exporting nation to remove the barrier that facilitates the
domestic monopoly power in that country. Again, one should be skep-
tical of such reasoning. Deardorff has noted:
On the face of it, however, this is hardly what those who seek protection
under the antidumping statutes have in mind. They almost surely are
looking for a higher price with which to compete, and would be dis-
mayed if the only effect of their actions were to open up foreign markets
to greater competition. Nonetheless, as a matter of global policy, this
might be defended as moving the world closer to a global optimum. I
regard this as a questionable justification for national policies, however,
given especially that firms can acquire domestic monopoly power
through so many other means than trade barriers.70
If nations really do wish to liberalize the economies of their trading
partners, is unilateral use of antidumping duties the most appropriate
way to communicate and effectuate such a wish? Would it not be more
appropriate to use the multilateral forum of GATT, in'particular the
dispute-settlement procedures, to bring down such barriers?
Evidence as to the "liberalizing" function of the international prin-
ciples is sparse. If the only reason for having an antidumping system at
the GATT level was to control national antidumping law, then the
most effective way of doing this might be to prohibit national rules, in
the same way that article XI essentially prohibits quotas. It is difficult
to prove the existence of a consensus on the functions of the interna-
tional principles because virtually no discussion took place on the ne-
cessity for such principles.
Some evidence does exist, however, for the "liberalizing" function
of the international principles. The U.S., as the major actor in the ne-
gotiations, seemed committed both to national antidumping rules and
international principles proscribing dumping. Nevertheless, it care-
fully limited the use of national rules to prevent protectionism. 7' This
was achieved by subjecting the national rules to an injury test, which
70. See Deardorff, supra note 1.
71. This statement, however, has to be qualified in part. The incorporation of the antidump-
ing rules in the GATT was not seen as essential by the U.S. In essence, the U.S. only demanded
provisions in the GATT which would protect the benefit of its tariff concession. The U.S. dele-
gate Mr. Brown is on record as noting that the U.S. did not regard antidumping rules as essential
to protect U.S. tariff concessions in the GATT. Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment: Tenth Meeting of the Tariff Agreement
Committee, GATT E/PC/T/TAC/PV/10, at 45 (1946). However, Mr. Brown had earlier im-
plied that such an observation was only related to the protection of U.S. tariff concessions. Sec-
ond Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment: Sixth Meeting of the Tariff Agreement Committee, GATT E/PC/T/TAC/PV/6, at
7-13 (1946). Whether antidumping or other principles were necessary to a liberalizing trading
regime was not under discussion in that forum.
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allowed reaction only if the dumping caused injury to domestic
prod'ucers.
However, the U.S. position was not the only one. At one end of the
spectrum, the U.K. reserved its position that all national antidumping
and countervailing duty actions should be prohibited. 72 At the other
end, certain nations wanted to make the international principles even
more effective against dumping. Some wished to include an express
condemnation of dumping,73 and others wished to exclude the injury
test.74 However, one should be cautious before concluding that these
nations wished to condemn non-injurious dumping because they be-
lieved that dumping was injurious to world welfare. These nations
may, in fact, have demanded such a condemnation in order to be able
to protect local industries.
The compromise, which substantially reflected the U.S. position,
allowed for a condemnation of injurious dumping. This was a substan-
tial defeat for the nations wishing to have an unconditional condemna-
tion of dumping, and probably resulted from U.S. concerns over its
possible abuses by protectionist states.
For our purposes, however, the fundamental point still remains: If
the U.S. only wanted to stop national abuses of antidumping, why did
it not push for the prohibition of national antidumping rules?
Several possibilities exist. First, a major problem with the liberali-
zation of world trade involves the relationship of the international
principles with the concrete results of the implementation of such
principles. The beneficial effects of liberalization are spread very thinly
among the world consumers who pay less for their goods. The "bad"
effects of liberalization are concentrated among inefficient producers of
the product. However, these producers are likely to be more focused,
more powerful, and more politically influential than consumers. The
problem that advocates of liberalization have is how to convince the
voter that the positive effects of the process outweigh the negative out-
comes. This is often an impossible task. An enlightened executive
72. See GATT E/PC/T/C. II/W. 27 (1946).
73. See, e.g., the views of Cuba and Lebanon, Revised Annotated Agenda for Chapter IV,
GATT E/CONF. 2/C. 3/10, at 2-3 (1947), where they suggested, inter alia, that
the practice of "dumping" be condemned, in whatever form it may manifest itself, and that
all Members shall do the utmost within their powers to prevent and penalize such practices,
pursuant to a fair international commercial policy. Consequently, it is also agreed that all
members shall counteract any and all forms of dumping with appropriate measures and also
shall penalize such practices with the view to the protection of their domestic interests ....
China, Argentina, and Mexico proposed similar condemnations.
74. It should also be noted that article 11.5, supra note 35, also stated that "as a general rule"
duties should only be imposed in the presence of injury. The departures from this rule, however,
remained unarticulated.
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might try to appear to give domestic interest groups what they want
while minimizing the damage to international trade. It is possible that
antidumping rules operate in this way, too. Thus, U.S. trade negotia-
tors might have been aware of the repercussions that the removal of
the antidumping laws would have on domestic politics. To the general
public, dumping (clearly a pejorative term) is an evil. 75 It carries the
stigma of unfairly putting people out of jobs. Congress would have
been very wary of any system which did not control the phenomenon
of dumping. While the absence of an antidumping system might have
some basis in economic theory, persuading voters that they are better
off without protection from dumping would be a difficult task.
Second, Bhagwati and Petersmann suggest that the U.S., notwith-
standing its own self-interest, saw that international principles
designed to control the private act of dumping had some utility in
terms of world welfare. The U.S. was clearly intent on providing a
near-exhaustive system for the liberalization of world trade. The U.S.
proposals were very carefully crafted. It should not be forgotten that
part of the structure of trade liberalization restrained the use of private
restrictive practices which could replace or prop up public barriers.
Even though the U.S. saw that public barriers were significant, it real-
ized that private behavior, such as dumping or predatory monopoliza-
tion, could in fact impede liberalization of world trade as much as any
governmental act. The U.S. could afford such a principled and clear-
headed attitude when the rest of the world's economies were crippled
by war. The rebuilding of the Japanese and European economies, how-
ever, made it inevitable that the main thrust of national antidumping
policy would turn away from world trade liberalization and toward
preservation of domestic industries.
1. Antidumping and the GATT obligations
In support of the liberalizing function of the GATT rules, it might
be noted that the GATT system offers special "concessions" to nations
using antidumping law. First, article I does not apply to antidumping
measures. This argument was raised in one of the few dispute-settle-
ment proceedings relating to dumping. The Panel stated at paragraph
8:
If the low-cost producer is actually resorting to dumping practices, he
forgoes the protection embodied in the most-favoured-nation.clause. On
75. The economic analysis might simply have been buried under the more powerful gut reac-
tion that dumping is "unfair." A major thread of Western political philosophy provides argu-
ments for government protection of property and business. This deep belief in property has




the other hand, Article VI does not oblige an importing country to levy
an antidumping duty whenever there is a case of dumping, or to treat in
the same manner all suppliers who resort to such practices.
76
In addition, the GATT Secretariat has pointed out:
Although Article VI does not refer to Article I of the GATT, namely the
most-favoured-nation obligation, it is clear from the wording that a dis-
criminatory application of antidumping duties is in conformity with
GATT. As in all other instances where GATT provides an exception to
the obligation to grant most-favored-nation treatment, the application of
such an exception is limited in the interest of maintaining the greatest
possible freedom of trade.
77
Second, the imposition of duties under article VI are not subject to
the bindings of article 11.78 Third, some argue further that the an-
tidumping provisions are not subject to any of the GATT principles to
the extent that the conduct conforms to the wording of article VI. For
example, national antidumping laws do not have to have a domestic
counterpart punishing price discrimination, 79 since conduct in accord-
ance with article VI is outside the scope of article III. This argument
has limited scope, however, and if a nation tried to introduce criminal
sanctions80 rather than duties for dumping, as required by article VI,
then such behavior would be subject to the provisions of article III,
since it has stepped outside the conditions of article VI.
a. The 'fair"/"unfair" dichotomy
In support of the argument that the GATT system implicitly at-
tempts to control dumping, the difference between article VI and arti-
cle XIX might be noted. This differentiation may suggest a "fair"/
"unfair" dichotomy.81 The differences between article VI and article
XIX might suggest that each article pursues radically different objec-
76. GATT, Swedish Anti-Dumping Duties, BISD, 3 Supp. 81, 83 (1955).
77. See GATT L/712, at 5 (1957).
78. GATT, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. II, § 2(b), 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 187.
79. Cf. Davey, supra note 1; see also text accompanying note 76.
80. Currently there is an "antidumping" statute which does have a criminal sanction - the
Antidumping Act of 1916 - but this was passed prior to the GATT and thus is "grandfathered"
to the extent that it remains unchanged. However, the Act is largely a "dead letter" given the
almost prohibitive intent test. Attempts have been made to change the antidumping rules so as to
"criminalize" or privately punish such behavior. See S. 1655, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Unfair
Competition Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 1655 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Remedies Against the Dumping of Imports." Hearings on S. 1655 Before
the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986).
81. Hemmendinger, Shifting Sands: An Examination of the Philosophical Basis for U.S. Trade
Laws, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: THE LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE, ch. 2 (J. Jackson, R.
Cunningham, & C. Fortheim eds. 1985); Lowenfeld, supra note 1; Nicolaides, How Fair Is Fair
Trade?, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 147 (1987).
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tives. Article VI with its special concessions addresses the issue of un-
fair and potentially damaging trade, whereas article XIX deals with
the problem of short-term adjustment to fair trade. If this is the case,
then it seems unlikely, as some commentators suggest, that antidump-
ing laws can be replaced by a comprehensive international safeguards
system.
Any "fair"/"unfair" distinction is essentially political; quantitative
disciplines such as economics have very little to say on the subject.
However, simply because economics has no input on what is a norma-
tive issue, this distinction should not be ignored. It has a powerful
political appeal,82 and certain acts seem objectively unfair. Unfairness
is a spectrum; nations with a liberal trading regime have a narrower
perception of unfairness than protectionist nations. It is also possible
that the "fair"/"unfair" distinction revolves around the wish of na-
tions to deflect issues away from the behavior of their nationals and
towards the behavior of nationals from other states.83 Unfairness
moves the debate from the importing country to the exporting country.
While clearly no formal "fair"/"unfair" dichotomy exists in GATT,
certain relevant distinctions do exist.
(1). Condemnation of injurious behavior
Article VI states that dumping and subsidization where injurious
are to be condemned. 84 No parallel condemnation is found in article
XIX.85
(2). Article V, XIX and MFN
There is a difference in the application of the MFN rule between
articles VI and XIX. Safeguard actions are arguably subject to article
I in order to discourage their use and to make protection from fair
82. See supra note 4.
83. See Reich, The Economics of Illusion and the Illusion of Economics, 66 FOREIGN AFF.
516, 521 (1987):
[T]he responsibility for America's economic problems has been safely externalized. It is true,
of course, that some nations subsidize their exports to us and hobble our exports to them.
But absent international agreement on what sort of subsidies and non-tariff protections are
unfair, America's responses merely reflect what the United States unilaterally deems to be
unfair. The dominant metaphors create the impression of unsportsmanlike, if not indecent,
behavior - "tilting the playing field," "dumping"- when in reality the playing field has
always been as hilly as the Ozarks, and dumped goods are often known to American con-
sumers by the less perjorative term "bargains."
84. This would suggest that there is something unfair in the act of dumping, since injury to
import-competing producers is not able to be used as a rationale for long-term protection, ac-
cording to article XIX.
85. The substantial differences between articles VI and XIX may explain why the use of
antidumping actions relative to safeguard actions is on the increase.
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imports as politically difficult and short as possible. National an-
tidumping actions are a clear and explicit exception from article I,
since nations acting against dumping should be allowed to act against
the "offender" and to keep trade otherwise as free as possible.
(3). The period of relief
Given the condemnation of injurious dumping, relief under article
VI continues as long as the practice continues. Relief under article
XIX, however, is supposed to be short to medium-term. Under article
XIX, the safeguard measures are supposed to be only temporary be-
cause the trade is "fair," and the import competition should result
from structural changes. This is exactly what ought to happen under
the principle of comparative advantage and is, therefore, encouraged
with the palliative or "safety valve" of short-term relief for the import-
ing country. Injurious dumping, however, is unfair (because it is a
"proven" distortion) and requires a permanent measure because dump-
ing will distort as long as it continues.
2. Critique of the liberalization function of the principles
There are, however, a number of problems with the thesis pro-
pounded by Bhagwati. First, if the system were trying to eliminate
distortions, why would the regulation of dumping be at most permis-
sive and not obligatory? One reason may be that while most of the
GATT principles are framed in terms of negative obligations ("that
nations shall not . . . ." or "shall refrain from"), an obligation to pre-
vent dumping would have to be phrased in terms of a mandatory obli-
gation (to actually do something).
A better explanation of the permissive nature of antidumping ac-
tions is the idea that under certain circumstances, obligatory an-
tidumping actions play into the hands of the protectionist. GATT
rules do not dictate what nations must do in terms of economic policy,
but they do establish a hierarchy of options. GATT rules aim at en-
couraging the most liberal options and, to some extent, prohibiting the
most harmful options. Nations still have great freedom in their trade
relations, but are made aware that certain policy options are likely to
be costly since they open the acting nation up to compensatory claims.
An obligatory antidumping action would not only violate the right of
nations to determine their own level of protection, but would also raise
the question of whether an obligation to stop dumping could ever be
enforced. It should be noted that under the post-1947 GATT system,
it is unlikely that nations could dictate certain behavior either to their
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exporters or to importers.8 6
An even more compelling explanation is that the permissive nature
of antidumping actions represents a compromise between nations that
wanted no antidumping principles and those that wanted an explicit
condemnation of dumping. The GATT system has very few intellectu-
ally pure principles and most of the time represents a compromise be-
tween opposing factions. Allowing nations to react against dumping
would satisfy those that wished to condemn dumping, whereas condi-
tioning such a reaction upon certain findings - in particular, injury-
would please those nations thatwished to see no control of dumping.
Simply making dumping actions obligatory would not have repre-
sented a compromise at all.
A second criticism of the Bhagwati thesis asks why an injury re-
quirement is necessary if the system were trying to eliminate distor-
tions and why the existence of a domestic producer would be relevant
to the issue of whether a distortion should be controlled. If the system
was established to avoid distortions, then the existence of injury to a
competing producer ought to be irrelevant.
As noted above, it is possible that the existence of the injury test
was a compromise between those that wished to see dumping con-
demned and those who wished to see all antidumping actions prohib-
ited. Although the U.S. wished to see dumping controlled, it refused to
see antidumping actions become nontariff barriers. Under the princi-
ple of "administrability," the problem of how tO administer a concept
as imprecise as a "distortion of the free market"8 7 might be resolved
by saying that distortion is only actionable if injurious. This reduces
actions to the subset in which harm is proven.88 It is also a way of
86. Some have suggested that the loss to exporting countries caused by dumping is minimal
since "exporting countries have generally not thought it worthwhile to control dumping." The
GATT rules are permissive as to the right of importing countries to act against dumping but do
not on their face allow antidumping-type actions to be taken by exporting nations. Any attempt
to do so would almost certainly be taken to be an infringement of article XI. This issue was raised
in the recent GATT Panel Report on semiconductors, but the Panel did not decide whether
measures intended to stop exporters from dumping in third markets infringed article VI. How-
ever, they did find that where such measures infringed article XI, then they were to be prohib-
ited. While the point arguably is still open, it seems likely that as article VI is an exception from a
number of fundamental provisions of GATT, it should be construed narrowly. Since article VI
only talks of action by importing nations, it should not be expanded to include actions by export-
ing nations.
87. It is not possible to say in all situations that dumping harms the world, even though
almost by definition it will distort the system of resource allocation. In certain specific cases, the
allocation of resources is improved by the ability to dump in the same way that some subsidies
may actually ameliorate the effects of certain distortions within an economy.
88. It should be noted that the notion of harm to importing countries' domestic industry does
not necessarily tell us whether dumping has harmed the world, or even the importing nation
overall. However, the ability to administer the rule in a clear, multilaterally acceptable manner
might rule out allowing interventions which correct rather than distort the allocation of re-
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preventing the use of national laws as protectionist devices. Nations
are only able to react to the extent that the antidumping rules do not
themselves become distortions in the efficient allocation of resources.
By way of a conclusion, it is at least feasible that the international
antidumping law has two distinct facets: first, the more widely ac-
cepted one of controlling the national abuse of national antidumping
laws, and second, the more controversial one of controlling distortions
in international resource allocation.
E. The "Interface" Function
It is also possible that the international antidumping principles
serve a different purpose, one which was not explicitly recognized at
the outset of the GATT and had remained unarticulated in the prepar-
atory works.
Nations do not operate their economies along identical lines. Even
though most nations in the GATT system adhere to the principle of
free markets, implementation of that principle differs radically from
the formally free market nations to the developing states. Structural
differences are largely responsible for many of the trade problems fac-
ing the international system, and may consciously or unconsciously
foster the private firms' "ability" to dump. Nations such as the U.S.
feel aggrieved that countries like Japan and South Korea seem to con-
stantly run trade surpluses with them. When Japan and Korea were
small, underdeveloped industrial nations, their radically different com-
mercial system presented no problem to U.S. industry, which could
accept these different structures because they had little effect on its
trade. However, as Japan and the other Asian Tigers grew strong, they
began to eat into the U.S. markets. Attention became focused on their
commercial structures. U.S. industries- began commenting on, among
other things, the closeness of the State and industry, the long hours
worked by workers, the low pay, the poor conditions, and the aggres-
s.iveness with which the Asians chased sales. The number of antidump-
ing actions against such countries began to increase. It has, therefore,
been argued that such national rules are working as a mediative or
"interface" 8 9 mechanism which, while allowing disparate national
sources. Nations are able to react against behavior which distorts the putative allocation of re-
sources. Not all dumping distorts this allocation; not all dumping represents such an allocation.
89. See J. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 218-21 (1989). This idea was first ex-
plored in Jackson, United States Policy Regarding Disruptive Imports from State Trading Coun-
tries or Government-Owned Enterprises in INTERFACE ONE: PROCEEDING ON THE APPLICATION
OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS TO IMPORTS FROM STATE-CON-
TROLLED ECONOMIES OR STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 1-21 (D. Wallace, G. Spina, R. Rawson
and B. McGill eds. 1980).
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economies to interact, reduces the tensions brought about by differ-
ences in trading environments. This function would not attempt to
cleanse the international system of distortions,9" but only to subdue
protectionist pressures by reducing the "unfairness" of foreign com-
mercial structures. In this light, the international sanctioning of na-
tional rules is a "buffer" which ameliorates the effect of structural
differences when they get to the stage of intruding on the domestic
welfare of the importing nation. This rationale partially sidesteps the
fairness/unfairness debate by concentrating simply on dealing with the
problem. The "interface" argument does not suggest that the an-
tidumping methodology (price discrimination between home and ex-
port market) is the most appropriate way of dealing with (nor does it,
in fact, deal with) the problem of structural differences. However, it
does to an extent reduce the friction between differing systems. The
interface argument also suggests that maybe national antidumping
laws operate as a de facto safeguard measure because the ability to
effectively 9' reduce trade friction and placate concentrated producer
groups is at least as important a political function as the maximization
of national welfare.
There is some evidence that this is in fact what is happening in
national antidumping systems. Richard Wright has argued:
One aspect of [the recent EC antidumping cases against Japanese firms]
which deserves attention is the fact that the exporters' arguments against
the Council really amount to a plea for the Communities to ignore the
effects of the Japanese distribution system, which has enabled Japanese
companies to sell at high profits domestically and use these to "subsi-
dize" loss-making low cost sales in the EC and elsewhere. Since the
maintenance of this price discrimination is predicated upon the existence
of barriers, it would be wrong to ignore the effects of these in calculating
dumping margins.
A key argument in the controversy in the EC has been whether all
costs of related selling companies in Japan were "direct" and hence able
to be offset against the home market price. This argument is tantamount
to accepting that such costs are directly and functionally related to each
sale. The reality, as any businessman who has attempted to trade in Ja-
pan knows, is that these highly significant costs are in no way directly
linked to sales but instead represent for the large part general selling
costs in the market. These are very high because of the costly distribu-
tion system in Japan. It is this very system which acts as a positive disin-
centive to exporters to Japan. To offset the costs of this system,
90. Including the phenomena of dumping and potentially harmful antidumping actions.
91. The effective reduction of trade friction arguably requires a system that is easily adminis-
tered. This possibly accounts for a number of the more controversial aspects of the current sys-
tem, such as averaging in the calculation of the dumping margin. However, ease of application of
rules should not be the only criterion for judging the effectiveness of a law.
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therefore, in a dumping case, would be equivalent to denying the role it
plays in the maintenance of price discrimination.
92
This argument suggests that the European Community at least is
slightly amending its antidumping regime to take account of the spe-
cific structural factors that provide Japanese firms with a competitive
advantage over domestic firms in the EC market.
While the interface mechanism might help explain the prolifera-
tion of U.S. and EC antidumping actions against Japanese or non-mar-
ket economy firms, it does not help to explain antidumping actions
between economies so superficially similar (as, for example, the U.S.
and EC). For this reason, the "interface" theory is only a partial ex-
planation of the recent upsurge in antidumping activity.
Nor does the interface function provide an independent justifica-
tion for national antidumping systems. For example, Deardorff con-
cludes that the U.S. social security system, which allows U.S.
employers to escape the full cost of layoffs, is not a justification for
national antidumping policies. In all cases the most appropriate policy
response is to attack the cause of the problem (for example, by taxing
layoffs) and not to deal with its symptoms (for example, by placing an
import tax on imports competing with domestically produced
goods).
9 3
III. DOES DUMPING PRESENT A REAL PROBLEM?
In Section II, I endeavored to show that the GATT rules do not
simply exist as a way of regulating national antidumping actions.
However, even if we conclude that there is a liberalizing function to
the international principles, and that the national rules in fact support
this function, we should then inquire whether antidumping rules
(either national or international), with their focus on price discrimina-
tion, are in fact the best way of achieving this liberalizing function.
A. Preliminary Issues
First, we should note that the benefits and losses to the importing
and exporting nations as a result of dumping are unclear. An econo-
mist, if he or she knew the "slope of the curves," could tell us whether
the world as a whole, individual nations, or even individual sectors lost
or gained by dumping. However, such an analysis depends on the cir-
92. See Wright, Validity of Antidumping Remedies - Some Thoughts, in ANTI-DUMPING
LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, ch. 7, § 18 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst eds.
1989).
93. Deardorff, supra note 1, at 32.
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cumstances of the case. 94 In only a few limited cases can dumping
produce an unambiguous benefit or loss to the world. In a few cases,
therefore, international price discrimination might harm the importing
country. Under such circumstances, the presence of a regime aiming
either at deterring such behavior or offsetting its effect might be of
some use. However, those favoring abolition of the antidumping laws
are not simply arguing that the gains and losses from dumping are
unclear. They point out the absurdity of the imposition of a duty that
injures consumers in the importing country as a reaction to something
which may not harm.
Second, the reasons why firms dump and why nations might wish
to react are not necessarily connected. This might help explain why
nations persist in bringing antidumping actions even though the al-
leged dumper is acting in an economically rational manner. For exam-
ple, the fact that firms dump to reduce inventory or to expand total
output may be irrelevant from the point of view of the importing coun-
try. Its primary concern may be the injury to domestic producers, and
in particular, the preservation of domestic jobs. How or why injury is
caused may be of little interest. Nations might not be interested in
allocating resources efficiently, either domestically or internationally,
and may in fact be giving effect to non-economic criteria in carrying
out antidumping actions.
After mentioning these preliminary points, some discussion of the
enduring issues is inevitable.
B. Price Discrimination 95
There is an oft-cited belief that price discrimination is in some way
"unfair." Notwithstanding the avoidance of predation, this idea of un-
fairness was the major reason for the enactment of the U.S. law in
1921. To an economist, there is no necessary relation between unfair-
ness and price discrimination. 96 Indeed, the issue of "fairness" is not
susceptible to economic analysis but rather is more a value judgment
to be made by legislators or policy-makers. What is meant by "unfair"
is unclear. An example of the arbitrariness of the concept may help
clarify.
94. This is most clearly brought out in J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COM-
PETITION, ch. 16, 204-05 (2d ed. 1969).
95. Economists use a notion of price discrimination different from that commonly used. To
an economist, price discrimination means making two (or more) related sales at prices that are
not in the same proportion to the marginal cost of each sale.




Through the vagaries of current national antidumping law, a per-
son A may be determined to be selling in the United States at $18 and
in his own market at $20. Another person B may also be determined
to be selling in the United States at $18 and in his own market at $18.
The U.S. producers arguably feel no more competition in their home
market from A than B. 97 Why is exporter A acting unfairly and B
not? Why is it important simply to discover that a difference in price
exists? Why, in principle,98 should it matter that the price difference is
between the home and export markets? The answers are practically
bound up with the question of cross-subsidization between markets
and will be discussed below.
An economic analysis recognizes two sorts of price discrimination:
so called "persistent" discrimination and "sporadic" discrimination.
Arguments have been made that the former is far more pernicious
than the latter, and that, in fact, "sporadic" discrimination is necessary
in order to allow the price mechanism to function correctly. For exam-
ple, Richard Posner states:
[A]n effectively enforced across-the-board prohibition of price discrimi-
nation would have a serious - perhaps disastrous - impact on the abil-
ity of industries to adapt efficiently to changing circumstances, and in
particular on the natural tendency of cartels to collapse through cheating
that typically begins with discriminatory reductions.99
So not all price discrimination is per se bad. Notwithstanding Posner's
argument that price discrimination is necessary to the market process,
certain conditions might also allow the ability to discriminate in price
to be advantageous to everyone involved. For example, the ability to
charge two different prices may allow the producer to reach a quantity
at which production becomes possible; without such discrimination,
production would not occur.100 It is thus difficult to say that simple
97. Even if one were to argue that A could in theory "cross-subsidize" and B could not, one
would have to take into account the relative sales in each market. If A sold 95% of his produc-
tion in the U.S., for example, it would take an enormous margin of profit in the domestic market
to be able to fund sales in the U.S.
98. Formally, the antidumping rules do not apply to a situation where price discrimination
occurs between a market other than the home market of the alleged dumper and the importing
market. In practice, however, national rules do allow the choice of third markets as "surrogates"
for the home market price.
99. R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIFFER-
ENCES 15 (1976).
100. This observation has to be qualified by saying that the ability to produce may be of less
importance than the prohibition on price discrimination. This might be a consideration where an
alternative source of production is already on line. It could be a justification for the U.S. attitude
that patent-holders may discriminate in price if, without such discrimination, production would
not take place. In this situation, the existence of the intellectual property right makes it seem
likely that no alternative source of production is possible.
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price discrimination without more should invoke a protective reaction
against the discriminating state.
Lawyers argue that price discrimination potentially causes injury
in at least two related ways. The first way would be to injure direct
competitors of the price discriminator. If producer A is able to sell
widgets at different prices to purchasers, this may injure other produ-
cers of widgets, while not necessarily injuring the purchasers of wid-
gets. Under this scenario, the ability to effectively discriminate' 0 '
allows competitors in certain markets to be undercut and put out of
business. 10 2 The second method of injury occurs where the purchasers
of widgets are injured because of the price discrimination. This injury
occurs where the recipient of the higher price was unable to compete
with the purchaser at the lower price. For example if purchaser A
buys widgets at $5 and turns them into wodgets, he has a cost advan-
tage in the production of wodgets over B, who purchases the input
widgets at $10.
There are thus two primary concerns with price discrimination:
elimination of competition at the producer level, and elimination of
the competition at the purchaser level. Antidumping principles deal
with the first problem (in antitrust jargon "primary line discrimina-
tion"), but only imperfectly address the second type of harm.
10 3
An argument against a reaction to dumping would be that in react-
ing against objectively non-injurious behavior, nations benefit their
producers to the detriment of their consumers, possibly producing an
overall national loss. This result is seen as "irrational." Again, this
argument has little to do with the motive of the alleged dumper, deal-
ing instead simply with the relative efficiency of reacting. Currently,
antidumping law places a premium on domestic producer surplus, and
overall national welfare is largely ignored.
However, the idea of overall national welfare is emphasized in the
context of national price discrimination. National laws that look at
price discrimination tend to be ambiguous. The U.S. has a law on the
statute books' °4 essentially proscribing price discrimination, but it is
101. If one were worried about the ability to discriminate between markets, why should the
antidumping laws only be concerned with the home market and the export market? Why not
examine the possibility of discrimination between two foreign markets? Possibly at the time the
laws were devised, the problem was seen to be cartels. Home markets were clearly protected.
Secondly, under only limited circumstances could a firm or group of firms have a monopoly in a
foreign market but not the home market.
102. The damage to competitors may in the medium- to long-term harm purchasers by mak-
ing all purchasers pay more for the products because of the absence of effective competition. This
should not be confused with the question of damage between competitors at the purchasers' level.
103. In antidumping jargon, this would be called "upstream dumping."
104. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
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seldom enforced and its continued existence has been criticized.'t 5 If
legal reaction against price discrimination is not clearly warranted in
all cases in the national trade context, is there any reason to suggest
that the situation would change with respect to international trade?
One major difference might be the existence of many incongruities
at the international level caused by divergent national policies. The
domestic market operates in a manner more akin to perfect competi-
tion than the international market and will stubbornly resist any ef-
forts to monopolize it. The international market has governmental
barriers, differences in accounting, sales techniques, and cultural pref-
erences, all of which tend to make the existence of some level of mo-
nopoly power more likely than at the domestic level.
A second difference might be that at the domestic level, all advan-
tages from price discrimination are captured within the national con-
text. If a California firm discriminates against Ohio consumers, the
profit still stays within the U.S., will trickle down to stockholders 0 6 or
employees, 0 7 and will also possibly be taxed at the federal level. The
same behavior by a European or Japanese business will produce simi-
lar effects, but the positive effects (increased employment, bigger prof-
its, higher taxation) will be felt in the European or Japanese economy,
whereas the Ohio consumer (and therefore indirectly the U.S.) may
still be suffering. Thus, if price discrimination were practiced interna-
tionally, the net 108 beneficial effects of the discrimination might be
captured totally inside the exporting country. As noted by senior U.S.
trade official Bruce Smart, this result of international price discrimina-
tion might lead to differing policies between purely domestic and inter-
national behavior.'0 9 After observing that selling below cost is
common in the U.S. domestic context - and is legal, he pointed out
that "selling to Americans, by American firms competing with one
another, does not threaten to transfer wealth and unemployment
across national boundaries." '" 0
105. See e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 100; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 19 (1977).
106. The stockholders could be either American or foreign. Both, however, will pay tax on
dividends.
107. These are likely to be American.
108. Even if dumping benefited the, consumers in the importing country, the loss to the im-
port-competing industry might outweigh such a gain.
109. Smart, Trade Is Everything But Unfair, Wall St. J., June 22, 1987, at 27, col. I.
110. The point seems to refer to sales below cost but is equally applicable to price
discrimination.
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C. Predation
Predation has been the most sustained rationale for reacting
against dumping. As early as 1914, the U.S. Congress recognized that
price discrimination could be extremely harmful if purposefully de-
structive of competitors:
[I]t has been a most common practice of great and powerful combina-
tions engaged in commerce ... to lower prices of their commodities...
in certain communities and sections where they had competition, with
the intent to destroy and make unprofitable the business of their compet-
itors... Such a system... is so manifestly unfair and unjust, not only to
competitors who are directly injured thereby but [also] to the general
public .... I
Predation has also been one of the most controversial bases for
antidumping law. Some commentators argue that, like in the domestic
antitrust area, international predation has never and will never
work." t2 Others argue that if international predation does occur, the
current antitrust system- both in the exporting" 3 and importing"
4
country- is sufficient to deal with the problem.
A major problem with predation is that no accepted definition ex-
ists for what constitutes such behavior. Certainly selling below cost on
whatever basis one wishes to choose is not per se predatory. On the
other hand, a firm need not sell below cost in order to be predatory.
Predation is not possible for a number of reasons:
(a) predators have to take losses on all current sales in the hope of
uncertain profits in the future. Consequently, predators have no clear
way of calculating success because rational predators have to balance
uncertain future gains against certain present losses;
(b) predators must have and be able to maintain monopoly power;" 15
111. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914).
112. Some authoritative quotations can be found in Kamerschen, Predatory Pricing, Vertical
Integration and Market Foreclosure, INDUS. ORGANIZATION REV. 144, n. 12 (1974).
113. Davey, supra note 1, observes:
The dominance of trusts and cartels has generally declined as the major economic pow-
ers have adopted and enforced antitrust laws .... It is noteworthy, however, that what may
have been a major motivation for dumping in the early 1900's - the preservation of domes-
tic cartels - is not commonly alleged today, presumably because of the widespread exist-
ence of anti-cartel or antitrust laws, a relatively recent phenomenon.
While this observation is largely true, it is conspicuously not the case for Japan, where the gov-
ernment encourages cooperation on the domestic market through various means, not necessarily
only through exemptions from antitrust law.
114. While U.S. antitrust law may be formally appropriate for dealing with predatory con-
duct of the type currently dealt with under the antidumping law, certain problems of jurisdiction
and enforcement do exist. There is also the question of whether the standard of proof of preda-
tory intent is too high under the antitrust law. The reason why so few cases have been brought
may be due to the problems of proof rather than simply the infrequency of predatory conduct, as
some have suggested.
115. This power can result from (a) governmental barriers or (b) private acts. Objections to
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such power is facilitated by the possibility of price discrimination (and
hence, the link into antidumping law). However, both monopoly
power and the ability to price-discriminate are said to be destroyed by
the existence of competitors or the possibility of arbitrage.
116
However, simply achieving a monopoly position is insufficient if it
cannot be exploited. Therefore, (c) as a way of achieving or continu-
ing the monopoly, the predator must have the ability to exclude re-
entry, which in most cases is impossible. As soon as the predator raises
the price, the old competitors or new ones would (re-)enter.
Consequently, it is usually asserted that very little empirical evi-
dence of predation exists. Those skeptics of the existence of predation
further observe that where evidence of such behavior does exist, it is
usually by a group of predators, since individual predators are unlikely
to be sufficiently dominant to be able to exclude actual or potential
competitors from the market. 1 7 However, these predatory combines
are unlikely to endure because they are prone to cheating.1 8 The U.S.
national antidumping law have been raised on the basis that it is the governmental acts that are
causing the harm, and private traders should not be punished. The real focus of attention should
be on the removal of governmental restrictions in fora such as GATT or through bilateral agree-
ments. However, what is an importing country to do if dumping is facilitated by private barriers
to trade? To the extent that these barriers are predatory, a case may be made for using antidump-
ing actions to deter or offset the predation.
116. Arbitrage makes the continuation of some sort of monopoly unlikely with respect to
dumping. To the extent that the difference in prices between markets exceeds the transport costs,
then any rational competitor will send the goods to the high price market in order to destroy the
local monopoly. However, often formal and informal barriers operate to stop arbitrage. James
Fallows notes the "47th Street Photo paradox":
Japanese-made products are always cheaper in New York than in Tokyo. If Japan's mar-
kets were really open to new contenders and to price competition, 47th Street Photo itself
could make a fortune by shipping Japanese cameras and audio systems back to Tokyo and
selling them there.
Fallows, Containing Japan, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May, 1989, at 40, 43.
Notwithstanding some form of barrier to trade, however, if transport costs are a low percent-
age of the total cost, as with electronic goods or semiconductors, then arbitrage is very likely.
However, one should be skeptical of arbitrage in products that are not standardized or able to be
traded as a commodity. Complex goods such as consumer electronics need an extensive sales and
marketing structure. One cannot simply find a single purchaser for thousands of VCRs. Each
customer will want to view the good, test it, and expect after-sales service. Unless the arbitrageur
can take a free ride on local merchants' efforts, the need for such local services will substantially
reduce the likelihood of effective arbitrage, if not eliminate it. Such an example, however, is not
dependent upon geographically discrete markets. It is just as likely to happen within the same
state in the U.S. since competitors may be unable to provide a market for the goods.
117. National antidumping law and practice tends to suggest that predation by single firms is
not a concern of the rules since actions are brought against all firms from the exporting nation
and most of the time against several nations. However, actions against a single firm are in princi-
ple possible.
118. This was a major conclusion of the Supreme Court in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590 (1985), which stated:
Such a [predatory] conspiracy is incalculably more difficult to execute than an analogous
plan undertaken by a single predator. The conspirators must allocate the losses to be sus-
tained during the conspiracy's operation, and must also allocate any gains to be realized
from its success. Precisely because success is speculative and depends on a willingness to
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Supreme Court in Zenith v. Matsushita seemed to agree that predatory
conspiracies are unlikely. Not only was the likelihood of successful
coordination of the Japanese cartel remote, but also no evidence sug-
gested that the Japanese manufacturers had been able to exclude other
producers from the U.S. market. Their presumed aim of predation of
the U.S. market was "yet far distant." The inability to exclude other
producers from the market seems to be the decisive issue. Predation
has not occurred in televisions because of import competition from
other Far Eastern countries. In this case, therefore, the ability to stop
entry was missing. One should not assume that the ability to exclude
competition and raise prices is always missing.
If these arguments against predation were unambiguously sustain-
able, then there would be reason to exclude predatory conduct as a
rationale for antidumping laws. Is there any reason to doubt the above
arguments?
A standard argument for reacting against predatory dumping (i.e.
predation in international trade) runs as follows: A firm will raise
prices in its protected domestic market and dump in the foreign mar-
ket in order to "cross-subsidize" until it has driven out' 19 all possible
competitors. It will then raise the price in that foreign market and
gouge the foreign consumers. The objections to the likelihood of such
behavior would seem to lie both in the element of monopoly enjoyed
by the predator and the ability to exclude competition. There has to be
some reason why the predator can charge a higher price in his domes-
tic market. This could be due to governmental restraints, the operation
of a cartel, or simply the familiarity with the domestic product over an
imported one. There also has to be some reason why re-entry or entry
into the market is not feasible.
Differences between conditions in national markets and interna-
tional markets might make predation easier in the international con-
text. For example, in the domestic context, effective market
segmentation is more often not possible and effective arbitrage is possi-
ble than in the international market. Thus the domestic predator may
be taking a loss on all current sales in the hope that he or she can raise
the price at a later date when competition has been eliminated. How-
ever, it is possible in the international context that the predator does
not, in fact, suffer current losses. Assuming the existence of some form
endure losses for an indefinite period, each conspirator has a strong incentive to cheat, let-
ting its partner suffer the losses necessary to destroy the competition while sharing in any
gains if the conspiracy succeeds.




of market power, or more specifically the ability to cross-subsidize be-
tween markets, the predator can support losses in the export market
through profits in the home market. However, these assumptions can
be reversed. In some circumstances, market segmentation and the ab-
sence of arbitrage might be more likely in the domestic context than
the international context.
There are other reasons why the differences between the interna-
tional and domestic markets might be rejected. First, the much larger
international market is probably more difficult to predate than the do-
mestic market. Second, the above scenario completely ignores multi-
product firms. The argument of "certain present losses vs. future un-
certain gains" partly relies on single-product firms. A firm producing
only widgets might think twice before trying to destroy a firm that also
only produced widgets. But the possibility of success of predation is
greatly enhanced where the predator is a large conglomerate which
could cross-subsidize across product markets, and the target is a single
product firm or group of firms. However, there is no reason to believe
that multi-product firms only exist in the international, and not the
national, context. Therefore, the multi-product firm argument is also
not a basis for a distinction between the international and national
contexts. Having said that, it is no coincidence that this model par-
tially relates to the differences in industry structure between the U.S.
and Japanese semiconductor industries. Most (but not all) of the casu-
alties of the Japanese advance into the U.S. television market were also
single product firms.
D. Imperfect Competition and the Possibility of
International Predation
Nearly all markets are, to some extent, imperfect. Information and
products do not flow freely, and many industries involve the "learning
by doing" rationale. This might suggest that barriers to entry do, in
fact, exist. But the phrase "barriers to entry" is somewhat misunder-
stood. In common parlance, it means a high cost borne by anyone
wishing to enter production of a product. The large start-up costs of a
semiconductor fabrication plant are usually taken to be barriers to en-
try. However, economists understand the term differently and suggest
that a barrier to entry is a hurdle faced by new entrants to a market
that was not faced by an existing producer. A classic example is a
patent. The patent-holder can produce the good, but no one else can
without a licence. Barriers to entry are of three broad kinds: (a) natu-
ral barriers, such as a Minimum Efficient Scale, where for certain rea-
sons the market will only bear a limited number of firms because of the
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interaction between economies of scale and size of market; (b) barriers
created by firms such as advertising fees; and (c) governmental barri-
ers, such as patents.
A particular variant of the first kind might be termed an Absolute
Cost Advantage. A product might involve the use of a dynamic crea-
tion process, which is normally characterized as "learning by doing."
A firm that actually produces a product learns how to do it more effi-
ciently and more cheaply than a firm entering or re-entering the mar-
ket because of a declining marginal cost curve.
If a firm were able to reap large "learning by doing" advantages
and to produce on such a scale as to have significantly lower overall
costs than a rival, it could exclude that rival. While most of the re-
search on this type of behavior has focused on the closure of the do-
mestic market of the exporting nation, 120 predatory dumping might
have a similar result.
What might happen is that a firm produces a product, say com-
mercial aircraft, in which the economies of scale and the "learning-by-
doing" effects are large. It prices below its current cost with a view to
reducing its costs through economies of scale and/or "learning-by-do-
ing." Once it has achieved the scale and/or "learning-by-doing" econ-
omies, it will be pricing at or somewhere above cost. An economist
might argue that such a situation is not harmful. The consumer in the
importing country has received low (arguably dumped) prices in the
initial period and will receive the benefit of lower costs later on.
However, what if the firm reduces its price an "extra bit" so as to
keep any rival competitors out? It then has the market to itself as a
result of the high start-up costs of any potential rival. If the producer
then prices at below the price it would have charged had it had a rival,
but above the level at which it could price, the resulting situation
might harm consumers. While this might be theoretically true, it is
extremely difficult to produce evidence of a situation where predation
at the international level has succeeded.
A potential problem might also exist where a current producer is
able to take losses on this product by "cross-subsidizing" from other
profitable lines. Japanese conglomerates seem to be able to sell certain
lines at below cost (however defined) over the medium to long-term.
Such behavior surprises some economists since the Japanese seem to
120. See Krugman, Market Access and Competition in High Technology Industries: A Simula-
tion Exercise in PROTECTION AND COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 128-42 (H.
Kierzkowski ed. 1987); Baldwin and Krugman, Market Access and International Competition: A
Simulation Study of 16K Random Access Memories in EMPIRICAL, METHODS FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 171-99 (R. Feenstra ed. 1988).
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be acting "irrationally."' 2t Below cost pricing may be due to a pro-
tected home market, 122 but it may also be due to the ability of con-
glomerates to pour money from profitable products into other
products that seek a sales opening. In the case of semiconductors, this
problem is acute for the U.S. merchant industry,1 23 which produces
very few types of semiconductors. They have to compete against Japa-
nese conglomerates that produce a vast array of. consumer and indus-
trial electronics.'
24
Second, the ability to successfully predate may be enhanced where
governments intervene. While the inability to recover loss or to calcu-
late the prospects of success may theoretically be true, those prospects
are greatly enhanced by the possibility of government involvement, as
in the encouraging or mandating of an export cartel. It has been al-
leged that the Japanese government might be able to persuade the Jap-
anese semiconductor producers to fight foreign competition rather
than each other. In this manner, they could destroy the foreign compe-
tition. Again, the temptation would be to cheat on the government-
induced cartel, each firm believing that it can gain an edge. The will-
ingness to cheat would eventually compete away some or all of the
advantage gained by the cartel. However, this projects Western-type
behavior onto firms from other nations. It may transpire that coopera-
tion is possible between Japanese firms at least on the home market, to
the extent that they deem such behavior to be in their best interests.
That foreign firms view strategy in a different manner from U.S. firms
is not out of the question.
The problem with any form of government help in predation is
that such intervention clouds the distinction between antidumping
law, countervailing duty law, and targeting law. Government financial
assistance clearly increases the likelihood of successful predation. But
121. Davies and McGuinness examine the issue of dumping by a sales-maximizing rather
than profit-maximizing firm. Davies & McGuinness, Dumping at Less Than Marginal Cost, 12 J.
INT'L ECON. 169, 176-77 (1982). The reasons for sales-maximization as opposed to profit-max-
imization are beyond the scope of this paper.
122. But a protected home market would not allow all sales to be below some notion of cost.
123. The U.S. merchant industry is not the only producer of semiconductors, however. Both
IBM and AT&T produce a huge volume of semiconductors, amounting to a very significant
share of world production. However, this fact is usually overlooked.
124. See, for example, the statement of Robert Galvin, chairman of Motorola:
The Japanese even now are repeating the same strategy- illegal in this country- to target
256K RAM memories to drive out U.S. producers. Having succeeded in dynamic semicon-
ductor memory, they are now going back to target other device areas .... This country
must come to grips with the root of the problem- the Japanese cartels, and concerted
targeting action of single U.S. products, using prices ridiculously under normal learning
curves.
Galvin, Japanese Cartels, Products Targeting Chief Grievances, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Oct. 11,
1982, at 10.
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how about under a subsidy-type analysis? The attempts of a large air-
craft manufacturer to predate the international market might not be
troublesome if it receives no public assistance. Its ability to outlast its
competitors, potential or otherwise, depends on the depth of its own
pockets. However, if the same firm then receives government assist-
ance, its staying power becomes linked to government coffers. Simi-
larly, if the government of a predatory firm employs subtle targeting
measures, such as exemption from antitrust laws, then the likelihood
of predation increases because of the secure home-market base. How-
ever in each of these circumstances, the reasons underlying the law
probably point to different policy considerations and reactions. Cer-
tainly nations are less willing to accept the "benefit" of targeted subsi-
dies than they should be about private individuals attempting to
predate through dumping. However, it is not altogether clear as yet
what level of threat private predatory dumping does pose to national
welfare.
Another potential concern is the nebulous concept of "deterrence."
If a producer has gained a reputation for toughness in one product,
then competitors might be unwilling to compete with that firm in an-
other product. 25 A fortiori this will be the case where the government
of the "predating" firms backs up those firms in any proceedings in the
importing country. 1
26
While new insights on international competition may be cause for
concern, insufficient research has been done on whether predatory
dumping or even predation in general is really a problem at the inter-
national level. Until further information has been made available, it
seems safe to conclude that as yet international predation is only a
theoretical concern.
E. Predation and antidumping legislation
The current international antidumping system does not squarely
address the issue of predation, although the issue may have been a
motive in the system's promulgation. Both the ifiternational principles
125. See, e.g., The U.S. Chipmakers' Shaky Comeback, FORTUNE, June 20, 1988, at 60:
Despite the good news, most U.S. chipmakers aren't comfortable enough to go charging
back into the DRAM market. Says Jerry Sanders of AMD, which abandoned the business in
1986: "If you've been bitten once by a wild mad dog, there is a certain caution at your next
meeting."
126. A classic example of this behavior would be the statement offered by the Japanese gov-
ernment in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The Japanese
government issued a statement that part of the conduct complained of by the U.S. plaintiffs was
"compelled" by the government and that the defendants would have been subject to certain
sanctions had they disregarded this instruction. Although the issue of sovereign compulsion was
raised at the district court level, it was not considered in the Supreme Court case.
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and the national laws are concerned not with cost, but discrimination
with respect to price.
As commonly defined, predation has to be based on some notion of
sales below cost (however cost is defined). However, one should not
infer too much from nor reverse this common argument. Also, as it is
often defined, predation must involve sales below some notion of cost.
But this is only a necessary and not a sufficient requirement. Sales
below cost may be evidence of predation, but there are also many
other reasons why firms might sell below cost and not be predatory.
An example of below-cost, non-predatory behavior would be where a
firm is introducing a new product on a market and engages in below-
cost promotional sales in order to gain brand or product recognition.
The most crucial example is where a firm is meeting the below cost
price of its competitors engaging in a price war.
The antidumping rules discussed above focus on price discrimina-
tion and do not prima facie rely on a "below-cost" analysis. 127 Even
though antidumping law seems to deal with price discrimination, na-
tional antidumping laws have for a number of years had provisions
dealing with sales below the cost (however defined) of production.
1. The "sales below cost" basis of antidumping law
Under certain national systems, sales below cost on the home mar-
ket are disregarded because they are "not in the ordinary course of
trade." This system has two aspects. First, if sales on the home market
are made at less than the cost of producing the product and such sales
have been made over a substantial period, then such "below-cost"
sales may be disregarded from the normal value calculation. The re-
maining above-cost sales then form the basis of the normal value.
28
The exclusion of these low domestic prices increases the normal value
and thus makes the establishment of a dumping margin easier.
Secondly, if the remaining sales are not deemed to be an adequate
basis for calculating the normal value, then the constructed value will
be used. Under this test, all costs of production (fixed and variable), as
127. However, administrative agencies have suggested in some cases that a below-cost-of-
production rationale is contained within the national dumping provisions. For example, the U.S.
Tariff Commission has noted:
[Price discounting as a result of imports has] effectively caused a substantially large block of
the sales of domestic glass to be made at prices below industry costs. Such a condition is
anticompetitive and, if allowed to continue, would be monopolistic in result. The Antidump-
ing Act is designed to help prevent such conditions.
UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, 431 TC PuB. No. 6, Sheet Glass from France, Italy, and
West Germany (1971).
128. Constructed value is one of the bases for the calculation of normal value in the absence
of sufficient sales being made in the ordinary course of trade.
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well as general selling expenses and profits, are imputed to the
product. 1
29
The "sales below cost" rationale is a cost-based test being used as
an occasional adjunct to a traditional price discrimination test. While
the constructed value of the merchandise is compared to the actual
selling price in the importing country in order to establish a dumping
margin, the construction of cost (adjusted upwards for general ex-
penses and profit) works like a cost-based system. If the export price is
lower than the constructed cost (plus general expenses and profit),
then the exporter is selling on the export market at below cost.
The problem comes when the constructed cost is turned into a sell-
ing price since, at least in the U.S., minimum amounts for general ex-
penses (10%) and profit (8%) are added to this cost.130 To the extent
that these figures do not represent normal commercial practice in the
industry in question, then the U.S. system potentially harms both ex-
porters to the U.S. and U.S. downstream users and consumers. The
effect on the first group should be self-evident. The effect on U.S.
downstream users and consumers is that if antidumping duties are im-
posed and the demand for the imported goods is relatively inelastic,
the addition of 10% to cost, and then 8% more, burdens them to the
extent that lower general expenses or profits are normal.
If the current below-cost sales tests are themselves protectionist,
one might ask why the tests focus on sales below cost on the home
market. If sales below cost occur on the home market of the alleged
dumper, he or she is unlikely to be successfully predatory (and is prob-
ably not engaging in classic price discrimination). 131 In reply, the
sales-below-costs rules seem to operate to increase normal value in sit-
uations where it is not high enough to show dumping. What other
reason could there be for the irrebuttable fixed minimum of 10% gen-
eral expenses, or 8% profit? Secondly, one might note that the use of
"fully allocated costs" is not economically rational. 132 Economists and
most businessmen know that in a period of depressed sales, it is sensi-
ble to sell below average cost, as long the price is above marginal
cost. 133 While administrators and academics might argue that the use
129. Under U.S. law, the general selling expenses shall not, under any circumstances, be less
than ten percent of the cost of production, and profit shall not be less than eight percent of the
total of production costs and general selling expenses. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(l)(B)(i)(ii) (1980).
130. There appears to be no opportunity for the exporter to prove lower figures.
131. Concern with predatory dumping revolves around low prices in the export market and
high prices in the home market.
132. See, e.g., Deardorff, supra note 1, at 30-31.
133. However, even sales below marginal cost are not always economically irrational. For
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of a marginal cost test is almost impossible, this does not justify the
use of a fully allocated cost test.
Therefore, one might view the "below cost of production" rule as a
mongrel device to facilitate a finding of dumping, and therefore pro-
vide protection to domestic industry. It certainly has not introduced a
new and more economically rational basis for the execution of an-
tidumping investigations.
Antidumping law is not concerned with the level of prices, but
merely the existence of a difference in price between national markets.
Two examples may help to clarify. First, a person may be selling at
$20 in the U.S. and at $35 in his home market. His costs are $15 in
both markets (assuming negligible transport costs, as, for example,
with semiconductors). The ruling U.S. price may be $50 and the low-
est cost U.S. producer could profitably sell at $45. There is dumping,
and the U.S. producer is injured in the sense that he or she is being
undersold. But is the behavior unfair? The dumper has covered costs
in both markets. Second, a person sells at $20 in both markets, but his
costs are $18 in his home market and $22 in the export market (as-
suming significant transport costs, as, for example, with raw cotton).
The U.S. price is $25 and the lowest U.S. producer can produce for
$22. The U.S. producer is being undersold by virtue of the ability of
the exporter to cross-subsidize, but there is no dumping. 1
3 4
We should be under no illusion as to how the antidumping rules
currently work. Even though the national rules could not formally ad-
dress a situation in which price discrimination did not occur, the ad-
ministrative discretion built into every national system allows the rules
to be used to combat many types of behavior beyond simple price dis-
crimination including, arguably, predation. It is this "perversion" of
the international principles that is cause for most of the current
criticism.
IV. How MIGHT THE USE OF ANTIDUMPING LAW
BE CONSTRAINED?
The GATT system possibly permits the use of antidumping actions
as a way of discouraging distortions of competition, and it concen-
trates on price discrimination. This is not unambiguously bad since,
under certain circumstances, price discrimination may exploit a mo-
nopoly (with perfect price discrimination being the best way of exploit-
example, a firm may sell below marginal cost in a new market in order to gain new sales which
would then move costs down in the future.
134. This example is not necessarily predatory since there may be other reasons why such
discrimination is practiced.
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ing a monopoly). Unfortunately, the current system cannot
differentiate between good and bad cases of price discrimination. The
national rules are under attack since they impose costs on the con-
sumer without taking into account whether the dumping is in fact in-
juring the importing nation, let alone the world as a whole.
Taking the GATT antidumping principles to include the "system
preserving" function noted above in section IID, how might national
antidumping actions be constrained in such a way as to limit their
protectionist effect? How might a nation address the possibility that
predation is a problem?
A. A Digression: Controlling Predation
If predation is a problem, then using antidumping laws to deal
with it is not a "first best" option. Deardorff suggests that the best
method of solving the problem would be to tax the predator once the
predator tried to exploit its monopoly:
[I]f an importing country were to threaten credibly to tax imports only
once they become monopolized, and hence to tax away the monopoly
profits that are the supposed lure for predatory behavior, that behavior
would presumably stop. Taxing the cheap imports in the initial period
would stop it too, of course, but given the many alternative reasons that
exist for dumping, it would be unfortunate for the importing country to
deprive itself of cheap imports just because of its fear of predation, when
means exist for dealing with it later when the predatory intent has al-
ready been established.135
This solution is better than the use of antidumping law from the point
of view of the consumers, since they are allowed to have cheap imports
until price-gouging begins.
However, from the point of view of the producers, and more im-
portantly their voting employees, it seems extremely unlikely that
these groups would approve of a system which allowed them to be put
out of business for the benefit of the consumer. Where the industry
under predation is of some strategic importance, it would seem un-
likely that any nation would accept its loss for the sake of access to
low price supplies.
B. - Controlling Antidumping Law
If one accepts that the international GATT antidumping principles
have a partial "systems preserving" function, then one has to be care-
ful in arguing that national antidumping rules should be abolished. If
the removal of national antidumping law makes the likelihood of
135. Deardorff, supra note 1, at 36.
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dumping greater, the national rules should be kept in place and used,
but their use should be limited to situations in which the overall inter-
ests of the importing nation are furthered. However, a nation should
not act against dumping when it is simply in its interest to do so. The
traditional tests of dumping and material injury still must be fulfilled,
but a public interest analysis should be grafted into the system.
The most appropriate way of controlling the abuse of antidumping
law is to maintain the current national antidumping laws with their
price discrimination focus and to provide a stronger public interest
analysis1 36 which would focus, in particular, on the reasons for the
imposition of duties. This approach takes a prohibition on interna-
tional price discrimination and the current antidumping rules as part
of the political landscape, 137 but attempts to reduce the circumstances
in which the rules themselves have a protectionist effect by highlight-
ing the situations in which the importing nation emerges worse off. If a
nation is forced to make a rational choice between its overall national
welfare and the interest of certain domestic pressure groups, then that
nation will only act where it is as a whole threatened by the imports.
This might be construed as "industrial policy by the back door." I am
quite willing to accept such a label if those currently advocating the
136. I claim no originality with respect to this concern. For example, former Chairwoman of
the ITC Paula Stern has noted:
We should begin by fully examining the costs and benefits of all our options before, not
after, we act. For instance, in December [1985] the ITC found that the President's steel
restraint program - if it works as planned - will cost U.S. exporters of steel-containing
products over $15 billion. Unfortunately, this calculation of export disadvantage was re-
quested and aired only well after the import restraint program was underway.
Stern, The U.S. Trade System and the National Interest.- Can We Do Better?, 52 VITAL SPEECHES
OF THE DAY 389, 390 (1986).
Similarly, in a debate on the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Senator Peter
Wilson tabled an amendment requiring the ITC to produce an annual report on the "negative
economic impact of trade import restraint programs." 134 CONG. REC. S. 10,726 (1988). He
stated:
My amendment would require the ITC to report on the harm to consumers resulting
from protectionism. If the import restraint program on apparel makes Mrs. Jones pay more
for her kids [sic] back-to-school clothes, then we should fess-up and tell her that her own
Government is taking money out of her pocketbook, and we should fess-up and tell Mrs.
Jones how much more this wonderful Government protectionism is costing her.
My amendment would also require the ITC to do an assessment of job losses on [sic]
caused by our protectionism. If Jim Smith, a steelworker in my State of California, is laid
off because his own Government has cut off his employer's access to raw steel, then we
should fess-up and tell him that his own Government has put him out of work.
Mr. President, my amendment would require a little honesty with the American con-
sumer. My amendment would require a little honesty with American workers.
Id.
137. I have not discussed the underlying reasons why unilateral removal of national an-
tidumping laws is unlikely. However, one major reason why nations might decline to remove
unilaterally their national laws is that in doing so, they give away a substantial bargaining chip in
respect to other nations' protectionist laws. If, for example, the EC gave up its antidumping law,
it would then have one less thing to offer the U.S. as a concession for the U.S. giving up its
antidumping law.
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use of antidumping rules accept that the current "blunderbuss" use of
antidumping duties is "ad hoc and often irrational industrial policy by
the back door." I have no problem with allowing a nation to decide
which industries are sufficiently important to it that it will not accept
such industries' demise; my concern is that such decisions are not
taken in the cold light of day, with all the relevant facts and all the
relevant interests examined. Arguably, the system of international re-
source allocation is better served under a structure which pays atten-
tion to all the costs and benefits of imports, rather than under the
situation where only the interest of pressure groups are favored.
This "public interest" system avoids the issue of whether reacting
against the economically rational decision of firms is itself rational. As
noted above, nations probably do not care why firms dump, but care,
for example, very much about the effects that such actions have on the
level of employment in domestic industry, or the long-term effect on
the industrial base. By making the imposition of antidumping duties
dependent on a closer examination of national interests at stake, the
"public interest" system sidesteps the issue of whether dumping is or is
not objectively harmful.
Without a change at the international level, which seems unlikely,
price discrimination is likely to remain a dominant focus of national
unfair trade laws. Under such circumstances, the most appropriate so-
lution is to reduce the overall harm from such national acts, which can
take two forms. One form is cases in which price discrimination is
shown (whether fairly or not). No net loss to the importing nation is
shown, however, since there is no overall injury as a result of the
dumping. The second form is cases where price discrimination is
shown irrespective of the loss caused by the dumping. Reacting against
the dumping produces a net loss to national welfare.
The underlying rationale in eliminating such negative conse-
quences would be to encourage nations to act against dumping only
when they suffered a net loss. This simple criteria could include many
subtle issues and would allow nations to bring together a number of
potentially conflicting interests, such as consumer welfare and national
economic security. A system under which a nation explicitly decides
whether it needs a microwave or VCR industry is preferable to one in
which producer or consumer interests prevail. While we should be dis-
satisfied with any system in which trade policy becomes implicit indus-
trial policy, we should not blindly reject a system under which all
interests have been examined and a coherent policy adopted. The ad-
ministration of international "unfair" trading rules should not have to
depend only upon polar opposites: protectionist national rules with
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their producer bias or a complete absence of such rules. There is no
reason why antidumping rules should not consider the effect on com-
petition as well as on competitors.
As a way of implementing a "public interest" system nations
should attempt to undertake an additional series of investigations
before. imposing antidumping duties. Such analyses might examine in-
ter alia:
(a) the effect of dependency on foreign supplies, both in terms of
the affected industry and downstream users and overall na-
tional security (including military security);
(b) the effect of the dumping on the consumer of the product,
particular attention being given to the trade-off between lower
prices and long-term availability of alternative supplies in-
cluding inter alia
- the availability of alternative suppliers;
- the possibility of arbitrage, the existence of barriers to en-
try and re-entry in the particular industry, and any other
industry-specific characteristics of the international mar-
ket which might point to or eliminate the possibility of
predation;
(c) evidence of cross-subsidization by foreign firms, paying par-
ticular regard to cross-subsidization across product, rather
than simply geographical, markets;
(d) evidence of prolonged sales at a loss, taking into account the
relevant product cycle, the relationship between fixed and va-
riable costs and the potential for cross-subsidization above in
(c);
(e) the participation of the alleged predator in a government-
sponsored elevation plan, including, for example, special fi-
nancing or fiscal programs, government-sponsored private
procurement programs, exemption from antitrust or other re-
strictive regimes;
(f) any evidence of intention to eliminate current competition or
to exclude future competition; 138
(g) the present and likely level of research, development and in-
vestment funding in the domestic industry (in order to see
138. For example, the so-called "Hitachi memorandum." See United States-Japan Trade:
Semiconductors: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade, Productivity, and Economic Growth of
the Joint Economic Comm., 99th Cong., 1st. Sess.'1-19 (1985) (statements of Chairman Wilson,
the "Hitachi Memorandum," Wilson's letter to Tsuneo Tanaka, and Tanaka's reply to Wilson);
see also Congress Poised to Take Protectionist Action this Fall against Tokyo, Congressmen Warn,
[July- Dec.] 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1030 (1985).
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whether the domestic industry is in natural or enforced
decline);
(h) whether the attribution of "unfairness," determined through
the level of the dumping margin, significantly exceeds the
amount of injury caused to the domestic producers by the
dumped imports;
(i) whether the imposition of antidumping duties (up to the level
of the dumping margin) would restore the domestic industry
to profitability.
While these additional considerations might seem strange, I must
stress that they would only be extra considerations as to whether to
impose duties. This system could not be used to protect an industry
which was not facing material injury as a result of dumping. So while
military and economic security issues might not traditionally be seen
as part of an antidumping action, they might be issues in determining,
whether, in the presence of dumping and material injury, duties
should be imposed.
Such a detailed analysis should be made by an independent author-
ity composed inter alia of both producers' and consumers' groups. The
procedure should be as transparent as concerns for proprietary busi-
ness information would allow, and the results should be fully pub-
lished, with emphasis placed on the final "bottom-line" analysis: are
we better off by protecting against or accepting the cheap goods? Once
the recommendation of the independent body is made, either a deci-
sion should be made directly by the Executive as to how to implement
it, or more preferably, the Legislature should vote on the implementa-
tion of such recommendation, with such a vote being made public. The
involvement of the Legislature at the implementation stage de-
politicizes the investigation, but makes the members of the Legislature
accountable to the electorate for any decision to implement the recom-
mendation resulting from the investigation.
A minor problem with this approach is that nations might be able
to use antidumping actions where the nation gained from imposing
such duties. Fortunately, such circumstances are likely to be very lim-
ited. Since the conditions of an antidumping action need to be fulfilled
before moving to the public interest question, the above situation is no
worse than the current system.
A major problem with this approach is that unless it is accompa-
nied by comprehensive adoption of similar procedures in other trade
actions, it runs the risk of being circumvented. At the moment, the
perceived wisdom is that antidumping (and countervailing duty) ac-
tions are the most popular form of protection because they are auto-
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matic, easy to win, and the remedies are fairly effective. That is why
actions such as section 201, with its Presidential discretion, have fallen
into disuse. If antidumping actions were made harder to win for the
plaintiffs, then they would turn their attention to the most promising
alternative. Unless that avenue were also closed, there would be little
to gain from tightening up on the antidumping rules.
Another major problem with such an approach is that it does not
consider the effect of not imposing antidumping duties on the interna-
tional allocation of resources. If a nation discovered that it was never
better off by reacting against dumping, whether predatory or other-
wise, might the international regime collapse?
Deterrence should not be an excuse for protectionism. If nations
were instructed to use trade actions as a deterrent to unfair behavior, it
would seem likely that all sorts of unintended protectionist conse-
quences might ensue. Unless a principle of deterrence is explicitly
agreed upon in the international arena, the best test of "deterrence"
may simply be national self-interest. Is it worthwhile deterring the ar-
guably unfair actions of foreigners unless those actions cause any net
harm to you?
Nations should be aware of their role in "policing" the interna-
tional economy, but this role should not be misused. As noted
above, 13 9 in many cases, often those involving small exporters, the al-
leged dumper might not know what he is doing. These unintentional
cases should not worry us, and they certainly are not susceptible to
any form of deterrence. If intentional predation may be a problem,
then we ought to be concerned about it, and deterrence might play an
important role.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the premises of the GATT system, the system needs some
measures which attempt to control distortive measures, either at the
public or private level. In discussing the abolition of the national an-
tidumping laws, the effectiveness of the international system must be a
significant consideration since there appears to be an intimate link be-
tween the international and national rules.
From the national viewpoint, both price discrimination and inter-
national predation might be problems, particularly in industries in
which "learning by doing" presents an effective barrier to entry and a
difference in structure exists between national industries. Current an-
tidumping law does not clearly cover this issue. It does, however,
139. See supra note 69.
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cover areas which should not be reacted against since such reactive
measures may injure the net national welfare of the reacting nation.
Looking to national self-interest might subvert the deterrent/"polic-
ing" function of the rules. However, simply abolishing national an-
tidumping law would send a message to exporters that it is acceptable
to dump and possibly destroy the domestic industry of the importing
nation.
I agree entirely that the antidumping rules as currently operated
are protectionist. In a great proportion of the cases that currently pro-
ceed to duties, the producer is shielded from fair competition and the
consumer is hurt. In my opinion, however, that suggests a tightening
of the way in which the procedure currently operates and not a com-
plete rejection of the international principles.
